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Abstract 
Women remain underrepresented in the upper echelons of organizational 
management, which is known as organizational gender stratification (OGS). 
Individual processes, such as differential career choices between men and women, 
contribute to OGS, along with organizational processes, such as bias in 
performance appraisal evaluations. Furthermore, these factors hold implications 
for organizational workforce potential if promotion decisions depend on biased 
performance evaluations. The literature lacks an integration of these factors in 
examining their combinatorial dynamic effects, as well as an assessment of 
practical steps organizations can take to combat the cultivation of OGS. This 
study has two primary purposes. First, it examines how a set of five factors unfold 
over time and interactively lead to the emergence of key organizational outcomes 
such as OGS and organizational workforce potential. Second, it assesses the 
effectiveness of proposed human resource (HR) initiatives designed to reduce 
OGS and improve organizational workforce potential. To accomplish these goals, 
this study developed a computational model to conduct two virtual experiments 
on the set of factors responsible for OGS. The first virtual experiment focuses on 
examining the effects of the factors responsible for OGS, both individually and in 
combination. The second virtual experiment focuses on exploring how proposed 
HR initiatives may reduce OGS and ultimately improve organizational workforce 
potential. Results show that under three levels of bias (i.e., no bias, low bias, and 
high bias), differential patterns of OGS emerge based on the produced 
discrepancies between perceived performance and true performance of men and 
 
 
2 
women. In other words, organizations are not promoting their top talent due to 
held perceptions, which impacts workforce potential. These effects occur more 
rapidly and severely under high bias. Three bundles of HR initiatives (i.e., 
combating bias, removing familial effects, and evening the playing fields) also 
differentially impact OGS. Combating bias (i.e., removing bias in performance 
appraisal evaluations and selection) most strongly reduces OGS as a result of 
equalizing perceived and true performance evaluations. Improving parental leave, 
providing equal opportunities, and evening the playing field (i.e., having more 
women in line positions) were not as effective in reducing OGS. The implications 
of this study are twofold: 1) for researchers, focusing on underlying top-down and 
bottom-up processes provides a more nuanced understanding of psychological 
phenomena, such as OGS; 2) for practitioners, solving OGS involves assessing 
multiple factors, and has implications for workforce potential; the present study 
suggests focusing on reducing bias in performance appraisal and selection to 
combat OGS. 
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Human Resource Initiatives Addressing Factors Impacting Organizational 
Gender Stratification and Performance: A Computational Study 
Organizations with underrepresentation of women in upper management 
positions persistently face organizational gender stratification (OGS), or the 
differences in the employment pattern of men and women in organizations (Perry, 
Davis-Blake, & Kulik, 1994). In 2018, women only held 22% of C-suite positions 
across U.S. companies (Women in the Workplace, 2018). Subtle disadvantages 
for women, such as fewer chances to meaningfully participate in meetings and 
differences in the amount of developmental opportunities for men and women, 
create an uneven playing field for women pursuing upper level managerial 
positions. Research attributes numerous factors to this leadership gap, such as 
career decisions individuals make (Wellington, Kropf, & Gerkovich, 2003), 
which lead to the subtle, yet cascading phenomenon of OGS. OGS not only has 
implications for those directly impacted (i.e., women), but also for organizations 
indirectly. Research finds gender-diverse organizations are more likely to bring in 
top talent, appeal to customers (Hunt, Layton, & Prince, 2015), and have 
increased positive financial returns (Hoobler, Masterson, Nkomo, & Michel, 
2016; Hunt et al., 2015). This implies that management of human capital 
resources impacts organizational performance (Ployhart & Moliterno, 2011), thus 
organizations should be aware of the links between OGS and organizational 
workforce potential. 
 The “glass ceiling,” or the discrete barrier women and minorities face in 
the workplace that inhibits career progression (Crampton & Mishra, 1999), is a 
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phenomenon often used to describe OGS. Individual processes, such as 
differential career decisions of women and career delays (Wellington, Kropf, & 
Gerkovich, 2003; Women in the Workplace, 2016), remain a partial explanation 
for the glass ceiling effect. However, a large contributor to OGS comes from 
organizational processes. Differences in feedback and developmental 
opportunities received by women (Women in the Workplace, 2016), as well as 
bias against women in promotion (Lyness & Heilman, 2006), selection (Peterson 
& Saporta, 2004; Robison-Cox, Martell, & Emrich, 2007; Fernandez-Mateo & 
King, 2011; Dreher, Lee, & Clerkin, 2011; Azmat & Pertongolo, 2014; Women in 
the Workplace, 2016), and performance appraisal (Eagly, Makhijani, & Kloshy, 
1992; Cohen, Broschak, & Haveman, 1998), additionally contribute to OGS. To 
combat OGS, researchers and practitioners encourage organizations to adopt 
human resources (HR) initiatives, such as expanding family and medical leave 
policies offered by companies such as FaceBook, Netflix, and Starbucks 
(McGregor, 2017), or training employees on how to avoid bias when evaluating 
performance (Anderson, Ahman, King, Lindsey, Feyre, Ragone, & Kim, 2015). 
While previous research examined factors contributing to OGS in 
isolation, an integration of how these factors play out dynamically is needed. 
Moreover, researchers often attempt to study higher-level phenomena by 
combining individual level factors (e.g., gender bias) to explain organizational 
outcomes (e.g., OGS). OGS in organizations manifests as an emergent 
phenomenon where the consequences of behavior at the micro-level lead to a 
macro-level effect (Martell, Emrich, & Robison-Cox, 2012). OGS warrants a 
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multi-level approach to avoid misspecification of organizational-level phenomena 
by allowing for an examination of dynamically interacting factors that 
simultaneously produce OGS. Previous research offers insight to how 
organizations might combat OGS, yet, rarely assess the effectiveness of action 
taken by organizations in reducing OGS.  
The proposed study aims to examine how OGS unfolds dynamically in 
organizations and what organizations can do to reduce OGS through HR 
initiatives. The proposed study bridges the gap between the study of OGS as a 
construct versus an emergent phenomenon by incorporating processes occurring 
at various levels (e.g., individual and organizational) that influence OGS in 
organizations, as well as the implications it holds for organizational workforce 
potential. This research uses computational modeling, which allows for an 
examination of how numerous factors interact over time to produce emergent 
phenomena and provide the opportunity to comparatively evaluate interventions 
to influence emerged outcomes (Harrison, Lin, Carroll, & Carley, 2007). The 
present study investigates how the adoption of various HR initiatives helps to 
reduce OGS and impacts organizational workforce potential. 
Theoretical and Research Foundation for Studying Organizational Gender 
Stratification 
Organizational gender stratification (OGS), or organizational segregation 
based on gender (Martell et al., 2012), is an emergent organizational phenomenon 
resulting from the dynamic interaction of individual and organizational processes 
(Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). Research on these processes provides evidence for 
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their effects on inequity in the workplace and a foundation for exploring their 
dynamic, interactive effects. The current study builds on this foundation and 
assesses the potential effectiveness of HR initiatives to reduce OGS while 
simultaneously impacting organizational workforce potential. To build a model of 
dynamically, interacting factors contributing to OGS, I outline each factor in 
detail to justify its importance to understanding OGS. I then propose HR 
initiatives to address each of the contributing factors and bundle them according 
to the most practical arrangement of initiatives organizations can use to inform 
their HR practices. 
Factors Affecting Organizational Gender Stratification 
Both individual and organizational processes contribute to OGS in 
organizations. Individual processes, such as differences in the careers chosen by 
women (Wellington et al., 2003), are often blamed for the lack of female 
representation in upper organizational levels. Organizational processes, such as 
differences in developmental opportunities given to women (Women in the 
Workplace, 2016), are also believed to play a subtle, yet crucial role in OGS. This 
study examines five factors contributing to OGS. These factors are: (1) career 
decisions, (2) familial effects, (3) bias in selection evaluations, (4) bias in 
performance appraisal evaluations, and (5) differences in developmental 
opportunities presented to men and women. The following section will discuss 
these individual and organizational processes in detail. 
Individual Decision Processes. Individual decisions play a fundamental 
role in determining career paths (Wellington et al., 2003; Woodcock, Hernandez, 
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Estrada, & Schultz, 2012). Two critical individual decision processes impacting 
OGS are the pursuit of challenging jobs and work-life prioritization (Wellington 
et al., 2003; Sandberg, 2013). If women and men systematically differ in their 
individual decisions, then this generates pathways for the emergence of OGS in 
organizations. 
Career Decisions. Females are more likely to occupy staff positions in 
organizations where they play a support role, such as in Human Resources (HR), 
whereas males are more likely to occupy line positions where they receive greater 
responsibility over factors influencing an organization’s profits or losses 
(Catalyst, 2006). Importantly, experience in line positions provides crucial 
experience for managerial careers (Wellington et al., 2003). One possible 
explanation for females pursuing line positions with less frequency includes 
domain disidentification in which individuals separate themselves from a 
discipline due to chronic stereotype threat (Woodcock et al., 2012). An individual 
reduces his or her social identity when stereotypes of a given group include 
psychological and behavioral consequences for minority groups members, such as 
minority group members reinforcing a given stereotype. Social identity threat may 
differ amongst individuals as a result of situational cues regardless of a person’s 
confidence in a given domain. For example, Murphy et al. (2007) examined the 
influence of an individual underrepresented within a group (i.e., belonging to a 
numerical minority). They found that when women were primed to feel as though 
they belonged to the numerical minority, they reported feeling they did not belong 
at a conference, and thus, were less inclined to participate at the conference as a 
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result. The results from this study indicate that when women identify with a given 
domain, they tend to rely on situational cues, such as numerical representation, to 
obtain information on threats to their identities in reference to numerical 
representation (Murphy et al., 2007). Furthermore, the simple influence of 
gendering words in a masculine manner can also discourage women from 
applying for certain jobs due to the feeling that women do not belong in these jobs 
(Breaugh, 2013). If women tend to self-select out of positions deemed important 
for higher-level positions in organizations, then this provides a pathway for the 
emergence of OGS. Thus, it is imperative that women pursue line positions if they 
wish to garner higher-level managerial positions.  
Familial Effects. Another barrier women tend to face in their career 
advancement stems from familial choices, such as deciding to have children. The 
1993 Family and Medical Leave Act offers 12 weeks of unpaid leave for mothers 
in the U.S. and guarantees an individual the same job or a job of similar rank upon 
returning to work after taking leave (FML Report, 2012). Additionally, more 
women tend to take leave compared to men as a result of conceiving a child (FML 
Report, 2012). Although the passage of this act increases employment and 
retention for women once they conceive a child, their wages often decrease upon 
returning to work (Hofferth & Curtin, 2006). Multiple studies indicate that even 
after controlling for age, work experience, and education, women receive lower 
wages for choosing motherhood compared to those who do not (Waldfogel, 1996; 
Avellar & Smock, 2003). Organizations also do not entice women to return to 
work after conceiving children, and thus, this motherhood penalty may lead to 
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women missing out opportunities to fulfill their leadership potential. In fact, 
approximately 43% of women leave their jobs once conceiving children 
(Sandberg, 2013), terminating a woman’s career progression and exacerbating 
OGS in organizations. Systematic differences in the frequency with which women 
and men take leave creates another pathway for the emergence of OGS. Taking a 
leave of absence also relates to fewer promotions, lower salary, and lower 
performance evaluations for the year in which an individual took leave (Judiesch 
& Lyness, 1999), mothers especially. However, research finds men often receive 
a performance bonus if they are fathers (Hodges & Budig, 2010).  
Organizational Evaluation Processes. Organizational evaluations play a 
role in determining career trajectories and organizational effectiveness (Eagly, 
Makhijani, & Kloshy, 1992; DeNisi & Murphy, 2017). Three critical evaluative 
organizational processes include selection, performance appraisals, and promotion 
(Salgado, Viswesvaran, & Ones, 2001; DeNisi & Murphy, 2017; Cleveland, 
Murphy, & William, 1989). If evaluative organizational processes function 
differentially for men and women, then they provide multiple pathways for the 
emergence of OGS with implications for organizational workforce potential.    
Social role theory describes how individuals act in social situations, which 
stems from their social roles (Katz & Kahn, 1978; Eagly, 1987). Social roles 
provide descriptive information by conveying ways individuals act in a given 
situation and prescriptive information that explains ways individuals should act 
(Eagly, 1987). Social roles include gender roles (Eagly & Karau, 2002), where 
men are thought to possess more agentic characteristics, such as being 
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independent, dominant, and assertive (Wood & Eagly, 2012), and women are 
thought to possess more communal characteristics, such as being affectionate, 
sympathetic, and interpersonally sensitive (Bakan, 1966; Wood & Eagly, 2012). 
Moreover, individuals typically think of agentic characteristics (e.g., competitive, 
ambitious) when thinking of successful leaders (Schein 1973, 1975). Building on 
social role theory, role congruity theory posits individuals tend to get evaluated 
based on the amount of alignment they exhibit with their prescribed gender roles 
(Eagly & Karau, 2002). Those possessing agentic characteristics more closely 
resemble leaders, which results in incongruity when an individual does not align 
with their gender-stereotypic characteristics. For example, thinking of a female 
leader can elicit stereotypes about both women (i.e., communal characteristics) 
and leaders (i.e., agentic characteristics), resulting in role incongruence (Eagly & 
Karau, 2002), or a perceived lack of fit between being a female and being a 
manager (Fiske, 1993). 
These role expectations hold implications for selection, performance 
evaluation, and promotion processes. According to leader categorization theory, 
individuals form mental representations of leaders due to held perceptions (Lord, 
Foti, & De Vader, 1984). Individuals use these schemas to classify the traits or 
attributes expected of leaders into cognitive structures known as implicit 
leadership theories (Offermann & Coats, 2018). Implicit leadership theories 
(ILTs) can influence an individual’s behavioral expectations of a leader based on 
some archetype of desired leader behaviors (Offermann & Coats, 2018). ILTs 
influence leadership ratings with ratings biased by inaccurate representations of 
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leader behaviors that might not necessarily be occurring (Shondrick & Lord, 
2010; Offermann & Coats, 2018). While the “think manager, think male” mindset 
(Schein, Muller, Lituchy, & Liu, 1996) may exist to a lesser degree with 
approximately half of management jobs in the U.S. occupied by women (Catalyst, 
2014), Offermann and Coats (2018) discuss differences in perceptions of creative 
potential between men and women as a potential source of the limited number of 
women occupying male-dominated jobs. Proudfoot, Kay, and Koval (2015) found 
creativity more strongly tied to masculine characteristics compared to feminine 
characteristics, and female executives are rated as less innovative than their male 
counterparts. Offermann and Coats (2018) argue this helps shed light on the 
scarce number of women in STEM (science, technology, engineering, 
mathematics) careers due to a heightened emphasis placed on creativity and 
innovation. Moreover, individuals tend to evaluate the women they view as 
successful managers as also being more irrational and hostile than their male 
counterparts (Heilman, Block, & Martell, 1995). As a result, this unconscious bias 
exists in the screening and evaluation of female candidates for leadership roles, 
making it more difficult for women to receive consideration for leadership roles 
(Eagly & Karau, 2002). Recent research also finds the importance of implicit 
followership theories (IFTs; Braun, Stegmann, Hernandez Bark, Junker, & van 
Dick, 2017), or beliefs as to how followers should act, in that individuals use 
social roles to evaluate who is a successful follower based on an individual’s 
personal attributes. The follower role is comprised of being agentic and task-
oriented, but also, places emphasis on person-orientation (Junker & van Dick, 
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2014; Junker et al., 2016; Sy, 2010; Braun et al., 2017). Additionally, women are 
held to higher expectations for acting in communal manners when evaluated 
(Bear, Cushenbery, London, & Sherman, 2017). As a result, women are held to 
IFTs and experience a “pull effect” towards follower roles due to alignment with 
their gender roles, whereas men experience a “push effect” from follower roles, 
pushing them into leadership positions due to better alignment with leadership 
roles. This phenomenon, known as a “sticky floor,” restrains women into follower 
positions due to the perceived congruence between being a female and being a 
follower rather than a leader (Braun et al., 2017). 
Women in line positions are also rated lowest compared to all other 
management groups, such as women or men in staff positions, or men in line 
positions (Lyness & Heilman, 2006). Women in these positions tend to 
experience a disadvantage in performance evaluations compared to women in 
staff positions and men in both line and staff positions. This finding limits the 
potential for women to reach higher-level positions given the importance of 
possessing line experience for managerial success (Wellington et al., 2003).  
As a whole, these findings suggest that for women pursuing management 
careers, gender bias can harm performance evaluations, and ultimately, hinder 
promotional opportunities and career progression for women. Performance ratings 
influence subsequent promotions, and research suggests women who receive 
promotions obtain higher performance ratings compared to men who receive the 
equivalent promotions (Lyness & Heilman, 2006). This implies that, in order for 
women to receive promotions, they had to be viewed as more exceptional in their 
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accomplishments compared to men. In other words, to be at the same level as 
men, women must work harder than their male counterparts (Lyness & Heilman, 
2006). 
Selection Evaluation Bias. Organizations are more likely to hire men than 
women, and this male advantage increases with each organizational level 
(Women in the Workplace, 2016). As leadership roles become more prevalent 
with increasing organizational levels, these findings are not surprising from a role 
congruity perspective (Eagly & Karau, 2002). In other words, the closer women 
are to upper management, the more perceived incongruity manifests when 
evaluating women as leaders (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Additionally, due to 
differences in career selection between men and women into line and staff 
positions and how organizations more highly value line positions in comparison 
to staff positions (Wellington et al., 2003), women in external labor pools are 
disadvantaged when considered for open positions in an organization. 
Performance Appraisal Evaluation Bias. Foschi’s (1992, 1996, 2000) 
theory of double standards suggests that when evaluating performance, 
individuals use a different set of standards to evaluate the same performance 
based on gender to make a decision about an individual’s competence. Members 
of lower status groups (in this case, women) are evaluated with stricter standards 
for the same performance. As an example, research in the Netherlands finds 
students to be biased against female lecturers in their performance ratings 
(Mengel, Sauermann, & Zölitz, 2017). Female lecturers were rated lower than 
male lecturers, even when the teaching materials used by the lecturers were 
 
 
14 
exactly the same. Particularly surprising, students of the lecturers received similar 
course grades, and course grades improved at similar rates for courses taught by 
both male and female lecturers. Additionally, female lecturers received lower 
ratings by both male and female students, and these ratings saw an even sharper 
decline when the lecturer was a junior instructor (Mengel et al., 2017). Together, 
these findings suggest prohibitive barriers to promotion as a result of biased 
performance appraisal evaluations, which lead to lower overall performance 
ratings. To the extent such biases exist in an organization, OGS may emerge.  
The biases women experience in performance appraisal evaluations impact 
promotion decisions. It is more difficult for women to receive promotions to 
higher academic ranks compared to men, even after controlling for personal 
attributes such as publication history and career breaks, supporting the notion that 
women must work harder to receive outcomes on a similar level as men (Ward, 
2001). For example, women do not receive promotions at the same rate as men: 
for every 100 women promoted, approximately 130 men get promoted (Women in 
the Workplace, 2016). Furthermore, if biases exist in performance appraisal 
evaluations, organizations may fail to promote their top performers. 
Differences in Opportunities. As discussed previously, women experience 
differential selection, performance evaluation, and promotion processes. On 
average, women receive work less challenging compared to men. Only 67% of 
women (compared to 74% of men) report  meaningfully partaking in meetings, 
62% report receiving a challenging assignment (compared to 68% of men), and 
only 56% (compared to 63% of men) report being asked for their opinion when it 
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comes to important decisions (Women in the Workplace, 2016). Not only are 
women less appreciated and trusted compared to men, but only 49% of women 
(compared to 63% of men) report believing the input they give in their jobs is 
truly valued (Women in the Workplace, 2016). When it comes to fairness 
perceptions in the workplace, only 54% of women believe they are given equal 
opportunities for growth compared to peers and only 44% of women believe that 
opportunities in the workplace are allocated to the employees that truly deserve 
them (Women in the Workplace, 2016). Moreover, 33% of women report feeling 
difficulty in obtaining a raise, promotion, or advancing in their careers based on 
their gender, which nearly triples the percentage of men who feel their gender 
puts them at a disadvantage (Women in the Workplace, 2016). Kantola (2008) 
describes this phenomenon as a gendered division of labor in that the 
opportunities given to women are less valuable, often aligning with the female 
gender role, such as organizing social events (Eagly & Karau, 2002). As a result, 
women less often get the chance to display the necessary knowledge, skills, and 
abilities to advance in organizations.  
Women also are less inclined to ask for increased responsibility or 
opportunities at work. Female Ph.D. students at Carnegie Mellon University 
discovered the reason they were assigned as teaching assistants to other faculty 
members while the male students were teaching their own courses was due to the 
male students simply asking for this increased responsibility (Babcock & 
Laschever, 2008). When women miss out on developmental opportunities, they 
lose the chance to develop the necessary skills to prepare them for managerial 
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success, which can cause women to be overlooked when it comes to promotions. 
When an individual is passed over multiple times for various promotions, it 
signals that he or she is not suitable for future promotions which lowers their 
chances of being considered for future promotions (Martell et al., 2012).  
As a result, it is crucial women receive developmental opportunities 
within organizations to foster skills necessary to not only improve perceptions as 
management material, but to successfully execute managerial roles. Feedback on 
performance is also important for skill development and instrumental to an 
individual’s learning, motivation (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996), goal attainment 
(Schiemann, 2009), and job performance (Erez, 1977). Even when women are 
presented with more opportunities in their jobs, they do not receive the necessary 
feedback to successfully grow in their roles. For example, only 36% of female 
employees reported receiving feedback “sometimes”, “often”, or “very often” 
compared to 46% of the male employees. More specifically, 20% fewer women 
reported receiving difficult feedback they felt was necessary for improving 
performance (Women in the Workplace, 2016). Without developmental 
opportunities or feedback on how one is performing, women cannot know where 
they currently stand within an organization and may lack insight on how to 
improve performance for increased responsibility in their jobs. 
Summary. To summarize, women face barriers to career advancement at 
all levels of the organizational hierarchy (Baxter & Wright, 2000; Elliott & Smith, 
2004; Eagly, 2007), which partially results from biases in selection, performance 
appraisal evaluation, and differences in developmental opportunities between men 
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and women. Individual decisions, such as career and familial decisions, present 
additional challenges to the career progression of women. Table 1 provides a 
summary of the factors contributing to OGS. These factors result not only in 
OGS, but also, can affect organizational workforce potential by failing to 
accurately select and promote individuals based on true ability. 
Table 1 
Factors Influencing Organizational Gender Stratification. 
Factors Descriptions Process Level 
Career Decisions Women hold more staff positions, where they 
play a supporting role, whereas men hold more 
line positions, where they hold greater 
responsibility over an organization’s profits or 
losses (Catalyst, 2006) 
Individual 
Decision 
Process 
Familial Effects More women take leave compared to men, 
which holds implications for promotions, salary, 
and performance evaluations (Judiesch & 
Lyness, 1999); approximately 43% of women 
leave after conceiving children (Sandberg, 
2013) 
Individual 
Decision 
Process 
Selection 
Evaluation Bias 
Lack of fit between being a female and being a 
manager; men more likely hired into an 
organization compared to women, and this male 
advantage increases with each organizational 
level (Fiske, 1993; Women in the Workplace, 
2016) 
Organizational 
Process 
Performance 
Appraisal 
Evaluation Bias 
Foschi’s (1992, 1996, 2000) theory of double 
standards states individuals use a different set of 
standards to evaluate the same performance 
based on gender; members of lower status 
groups (e.g., women) get evaluated with stricter 
standards for the same performance (Mengel et 
al., 2017) 
Organizational 
Process 
Differences in 
Opportunities 
Women given less challenging work and report 
receiving less critical feedback than men; 
women report feeling their input not truly 
valued (Women in the Workplace, 2016); 
Organizational 
Process 
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women seek fewer developmental opportunities 
(Babcock & Laschever, 2008) 
 
Human Resource Initiatives to Reduce Organizational Gender Stratification 
 The five factors discussed represent actions and decisions that may lead to 
OGS. While not readily apparent that women receive fewer developmental 
opportunities than men in organizations, this subtle difference can largely impact 
the likelihood of developing the necessary skills to grow in one’s position and to 
demonstrate the capability to succeed at the next organizational level. 
Recognizing these subtleties exist is a step toward reducing OGS, and 
organizations need to take action to combat these problematic effects, not only to 
reduce OGS, but to increase organizational workforce potential. If organizations 
do not promote their top talent due to reduced performance perceptions of 
women, then organizational workforce potential suffers. Organizational gender 
studies typically provide suggestions of how to reduce OGS in organizations but 
fail to examine the effectiveness of HR initiatives to address the specified 
problems (Anderson et al., 2015). By examining the effectiveness of HR 
initiatives to reduce OGS in a formalized model, practitioners may better select 
interventions for an organization. The following sections review potential HR 
initiatives organizations can adopt to tackle each of the five factors contributing to 
OGS. 
Even the Playing Field. OGS begins with the career choices women and 
men make. Women tend to occupy more staff positions, whereas men occupy 
more line positions. Additionally, upper level managers are more likely to be 
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selected from a line position pool (Catalyst, 2006; Wellington et al., 2013), thus 
placing the starting line for women behind that of men. It is difficult to assess the 
true impact and potential benefit of more women in managerial careers without 
actively working to bring women into these roles. Addressing this phenomenon 
requires an environment in which all employees feel safe, supported, and 
confident to pursue career paths of their choosing without fear of failure or 
backlash. One of the factors dissuading women from pursuing these careers is the 
sense they belong to a numerical minority in managerial careers (Murphy et al., 
2007). Organizations can create an environment encouraging diversity, and 
regardless of the current gender composition of the organization, women should 
receive equal consideration as men for managerial positions. By creating an 
environment where men and women can achieve success in managerial careers, 
women should feel more confident to pursue stereotypically male careers, and this 
will increase the number of women in the applicant pool for open positions. To 
encourage women to pursue stereotypically masculine careers, organizations can 
write job postings in a gender-neutral tone to avoid discouraging women from 
applying (Breaugh, 2013). Moreover, organizational policies, such as affirmative 
action, which encourage women to pursue opportunities, can increase the number 
of women willing to enter competitive activities (Balafoutas & Sutter, 2012). 
Taken together, this implies simply informing women they will compete in a fair 
competition may increase the likelihood they will pursue situations they typically 
might avoid. 
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Remove the “Motherhood Penalty.” In comparison to other high-income 
countries, the United States falls far behind in mandating paid maternity leave 
(Gault, Hartmann, Hegewisch, Milli, & Reichlin, 2014). Research shows 
providing paid leave for mothers increases the odds women will return to work 
after conceiving a child, and also tends to reduce employer costs by increasing 
employee retention (Gault et al., 2014). In 2013, approximately 87% of U.S. 
employees from 11,893 worksites received access to unpaid family leave, whereas 
only 12% received access to paid family leave (Gault et al., 2014). A few U.S. 
states already adopted paid leave policies for new mothers (i.e., California, New 
Jersey, Washington State, and Rhode Island) with varying amounts of pay 
provided for women for different durations of leave (Gault et al., 2014). 
Organizations retain more female employees after childbirth when they grant 
women maternity benefits compared to when they do not grant such benefits 
(Waldfogel, 1996), implying that inequities exist across companies for women in 
relation to leave policies. For example, companies such as FaceBook, Netflix, and 
Starbucks offer benefits for employed mothers, including paid leave and/or longer 
leave periods. By providing paid medical leave, organizations can support 
employees, which may increase retention and career progression for these 
individuals (Boswell, Colvin, & Darnold, 2008). 
Reduce Selection Bias. The bias women experience in pursuing career 
goals begins with organizational selection decisions (Women in the Workplace, 
2016). Individuals often rely on heuristics, or mental shortcuts, when making 
decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), which helps explain why stereotypes 
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persist. When hiring individuals for managerial positions, it is imperative that 
those making the hiring decisions receive only relevant information during 
screening of job applicants. If organizations utilize interviews during the hiring 
process, then those making hiring decisions should receive training on how to use 
only the necessary objective information to make a decision. Furthermore, 
decision-makers should receive as much time as needed to make the proper hiring 
decision to avoid the use of heuristics (i.e., stereotypes) in selecting candidates.  
Organizations should conduct interviews in a standardized manner to 
ensure consistency of evaluation across job candidates. In addition, interviews 
should strive for objectivity, and tap into specific, behaviorally-oriented, and job-
related criteria (Williamson, Campion, Malos, Roehling, & Campion, 1997). 
Multiple interviewers improve reliability and validity of interviews, and generally 
offer organizations protection against unlawful employment discrimination 
(Williamson et al.,1997). Furthermore, to increase the consistency of interviews 
across job candidates, employers should use multiple interview scales with 
detailed anchor ratings, use the same interviewers for all job candidates, and 
should not discuss the job candidate in question amongst interview raters to avoid 
any non-job-related evaluations during the selection of job candidates (Campion, 
Palmer, & Campion, 1997). 
Reduce Performance Appraisal Evaluation Bias. To lessen bias in 
performance evaluations, organizations can give individuals providing employee 
ratings more performance information to allow for more accurate ratings as well 
as allowing uninterrupted time for making evaluations and increasing rater 
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accountability (Roberson et al., 2007). Organizations can use multi-rater systems 
to avoid bias from a single individual, as well as encouraging managers to build 
trust and relationships with all subordinates, regardless of gender (Applebaum, 
Roy, & Gilliand, 2011).  
To increase the accuracy of performance evaluation ratings, organizations 
can provide frame of reference (FOR) training (Hauenstein, 1998). FOR training 
involves defining performance dimensions to rate individuals and providing 
examples of behavioral incidents to illustrate the desired behavior of each 
dimension. FOR training provides raters with the necessary standards to evaluate 
employees fairly by focusing on accuracy of performance evaluation decisions. 
Research suggests FOR is an effective strategy for training raters to increase not 
only the behavioral accuracy represented in a rater’s mind, but also the accuracy 
of the performance evaluation rating itself (Woeher & Huffcutt, 1994).  
Raters can also receive training on using methods shown to reduce gender 
bias. Structured free recall (SFR) asks raters to consider both positive and 
negative behaviors that an individual enacts to avoid basing ratings of an 
individual on general evaluations (Anderson et al., 2015). Bauer and Baltes 
(2002) found this method reduces bias against females when their performance 
gets evaluated. Under source monitoring (SM), raters differentiate between 
“known” and “remembered” judgments. Raters tend to view remembered 
judgments as more objective, or not influenced by personal thoughts and feelings, 
and therefore, less influenced by behavioral expectations (Anderson et al., 2015). 
Error management training (EMT) initiates an active learning process where 
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raters make errors so they can learn from the errors to promote self-regulation in 
their behavior (Anderson et al., 2015). Organizations can adopt any of these rater-
training approaches to bring gender bias-awareness to employees to reduce rating 
errors. 
Organizations often rely on performance evaluations to make promotion 
decisions (Cleveland et al., 1989). Research finds a promotion bias amongst men 
such that men prefer to support and promote male leaders (Bosak & Sczeny, 
2011), which results in a self-perpetuating cycle of male-dominated management 
(Braun et al., 2017). Thus it is imperative that organizations make promotion 
decisions through a fair process. As mentioned previously, bias in performance 
evaluation ratings can be reduced by using various rater training strategies (i.e., 
FOR training, SFR, SM, EMT). By adopting these training methods to avoid bias 
in performance appraisal evaluations, those providing performance appraisal 
evaluations will base evaluations on more objective information by focusing on 
concrete, observed behaviors. As a result, ideally the candidates considered for 
promotions truly perform well in their current jobs, and thus, are best suited for a 
promotion.  
Provide Equal Opportunities. Even if women pursue jobs needed for 
managerial careers, receive equal chances for hiring, and are evaluated without 
bias, women may not receive the same developmental opportunities as men in the 
same jobs (Women in the Workplace, 2016). At the same time, women do not ask 
for developmental opportunities at the same rate as men (Babcock & Laschever, 
2008). This keeps women behind in development for top management positions. 
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Organizations need to track who receives developmental opportunities at work, 
and women need to actively seek out opportunities by asking their managers for 
greater responsibilities. Women need feedback on work performance and needs 
for improvement. Every employee, namely supervisors and managers, should feel 
safe to provide feedback to both women and men with the same quality and focus 
on developing an individual’s skills. A proposed solution to equate developmental 
opportunities for men and women includes three components: (1) bringing 
awareness to differences in opportunity seeking propensity between men and 
women; (2) organizations equitably managing opportunities for training and 
development; (3) organizations equitably providing feedback to facilitate 
learning, motivation, (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996) and goal attainment (Schiemann, 
2009), all critical for job performance (Payne, Youngcourt, & Beaubien, 2007). 
Summary. Adopting HR initiatives to combat factors contributing to OGS 
serves two purposes. First, diversifying the leadership styles present in an 
organization can beneficially impact organizational success. Although research 
suggests increased diversity may not always lead to optimal performance, 
increasing gender diversity in organizations helps organizations expand their 
talent pool, increase employee satisfaction, and improve decision-making by 
enhancing creative perspectives (Hunt, Layton, & Prince, 2015). Moreover, with 
organizations adopting flatter organizational structures (e.g., Google; Gupta, 
2016), where cooperation and coordination prove essential, participative 
leadership styles (i.e., styles exhibited by women) may prove more beneficial to 
these organizational structures due to more teams-based management (Applebaum 
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et al., 2003). Thus, female leaders can offer strategic value to organizations. 
Second, when evaluating females for leadership roles, biases held against women 
hold implications for organizational workforce potential. By evaluating females 
lower than males in organizations, and by overlooking individuals with lower 
performance evaluations, individuals with the highest perceived performance get 
selected and promoted to higher levels within the organization rather than those 
who truly perform the best. Thus, organizations may achieve sub-optimal 
performance levels due to not hiring and promoting the true top performers. 
Although the mechanism of the connection remains unclear, organizations with 
women in leadership positions tend to achieve effective financial organizational 
performance (Hoobler et al., 2016). 
Organizations may adopt HR initiatives independently or in conjunction 
with other HR initiatives. While the HR initiatives reviewed all hold implications 
for OGS and workforce potential (see Table 2 for a summary), they do require 
time and effort by organizations. To influence career decisions of individuals, 
organizations may minimally alter current recruitment strategies by adjusting job 
postings to gender-neutral language (Breaugh, 2013). Providing paid maternity 
leave for women can potentially save organizations money by increasing 
employee retention after taking leave (Gault et al., 2014). Reducing selection bias 
involves allotting time and resources to properly structure the interview process 
and to train interviewers to accurately assess job candidates. Reducing 
performance evaluation bias requires a similar process in which raters need to 
receive training on how to accurately document and rate performance behaviors, 
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which involves investing resources and time into these processes. Reducing bias 
in promotions requires organizations to track current promotion processes and to 
ensure promotion decisions stem from accurate information. Finally, providing 
equal opportunities to males and females requires organizations to track who 
receives developmental opportunities, irrespective of who asks for them.  
 
Table 2 
Description of Human Resource Initiatives. 
Factor HR Initiative 
Even the Playing Field Gender neutral job postings (Breaugh, 2013); 
affirmative action for line position jobs (Balafoutas & 
Sutter, 2012) 
Remove the 
“Motherhood Penalty” 
Providing better medical leave (e.g., paid leave; 
Boswell, Colvin, & Darnold, 2008) 
Reduce Selection Bias Training for selection decisions; standardized 
interview process; multiple interviewers (Williamson 
et al.,1997; Campion et al., 1997) 
Reduce Performance 
Evaluation Bias 
Multi-rater performance appraisal systems; FOR 
training (Hauenstein, 1998); SFR, SM, EMT 
(Anderson et al., 2015) 
Provide Equal 
Opportunities 
Provide equal opportunities for increased 
responsibility (Babcock & Laschever, 2008); provide 
constructive feedback through performance 
management (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996) 
 
 
 
Critical Factors for Organizational Workforce Potential 
In understanding organizational workforce potential, organizations need to 
consider individual contributions to organizational objectives and goals. 
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Organizations need to evaluate individual contributions to organizational 
objectives from multiple perspectives including the execution and performance of 
normal job duties, and, especially in the context of considering individuals for 
promotions to higher-level (i.e., managerial) positions, leadership quality. 
Individual performance behaviors involve job-related activities that contribute to 
an employee’s formal organizational role. In formal organizational roles, 
employees enact performance behaviors to accomplish tasks, duties, and 
responsibilities (TDRs) for their position. The execution of TDRs by employees 
serves as a fundamental contributor to organizational productivity (Ostroff, 1992). 
Naturally, another fundamental contributor to organizational effectiveness comes 
from managers enacting leadership behaviors. Not surprisingly, leadership 
effectiveness contributes to organizational performance (Jing & Avery, 2008). 
Furthermore, research findings suggest the quality of leadership exhibited by 
managers results in performance improvements of employees, especially in light 
of competitive organizational dynamics (Avolio, 1999; Lado, Boyd, & Wright, 
1992; McGrath & MacMillan, 2000; Rowe, 2001; Tecee, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). 
Thus, in order for organizations to successfully achieve organizational objectives 
and goals, organizations need employees who can successfully execute normal 
job duties and possess the potential to effectively lead fellow organizational 
members to accomplish stated organizational objectives and goals. Organizations 
that effectively reward such competencies will achieve superior organizational 
performance (Becker, Huselid, & Beatty, 2009). 
Using Computational Modeling to Investigate Gender Stratification  
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 OGS in organizations manifests as an emergent phenomenon where the 
consequences of behavior at the micro-level lead to macro-level effects (Martell 
et al., 2012). Previous research isolated various factors contributing to the lack of 
women in managerial positions but only limitedly examined their combinatorial 
effects. While empirical researchers examine how a set of factors relate to key 
outcomes, an often-neglected area of study in industrial and organizational 
psychology involves representing the interactive processes stemming from 
mechanisms underlying phenomena of interest (Kozlowski, Chao, Grand, Braun, 
& Kuljanin, 2013). For example, bias in performance appraisal serves as a 
contributing factor for why so few women in top management positions, yet it 
constitutes one piece to a complex, multidimensional, multilevel, and dynamic 
puzzle. Investigating the combinatorial and dynamic effects of these factors in a 
standard research setting necessitates first a thorough theoretical investigation. To 
achieve such a thorough theoretical investigation, I utilize computational 
modeling as an integrative approach to studying OGS. 
Computational Modeling 
Researchers traditionally examine psychological phenomena through 
narrative theory or limited empirical data investigations in industrial and 
organizational psychology. These approaches cannot sufficiently assess multiple 
interdependent processes operating simultaneously (Harrison et al., 2007; 
Kozlowski et al., 2013). To address this issue, researchers can utilize computer 
simulations to examine processes unfolding over time as a function of a set of 
inputs (Harrison et al., 2007). Computational models convert narrative theory of 
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psychological processes into a computer program to investigate theoretical logic, 
predictions, and implications (Kozlowski et al., 2013). Formulating a 
computational model involves utilizing equations, algorithms, and/or logical 
statements (Grand et al., 2016). Computational modeling allows researchers to 
build and assess theory, examine factors and processes underlying large-scale 
stratification in organizations, and design and assess potential interventions to 
resolve a persistent organizational problem (Martell et al., 2012). 
Computer-based simulations of organizations can model both micro- and 
macro-level phenomena. Micro-phenomena represent ongoing processes at a 
lower-level of analysis (e.g., individuals) whereas macro-phenomena (e.g., 
organizational processes) represent situational constraints acting on lower-levels. 
Similarly, bottom-up phenomena originate at lower levels (e.g., individual) and 
exhibit emergent properties at higher levels (e.g., organizational; Kozlowski & 
Klein, 2000). Given the common representation of organizations as a multi-level 
system, OGS emerges as a result of interacting bottom-up and top-down 
processes. In the current study, individual- (i.e., career decisions and familial 
effects) and organizational-level processes (i.e., selection decisions, performance 
appraisals, and developmental opportunities) simultaneously contribute to the 
emergence of OGS and workforce potential. 
Previous research utilized computational modeling to examine OGS. 
Martell et al. (1996) focused on organizational factors that influence OGS by 
assessing gender bias in performance ratings at various levels within an 
organization. They programmed an evaluation bias favoring male performance in 
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organizations to account for 1% and 5% of the variance in performance ratings 
which was used to make promotion decisions. Adding 2.01 bias points to 
performance of males accounted for 1% of variance in performance evaluations, 
and adding 4.58 bias points to performance of males accounted for 5% of variance 
in performance evaluations. Adding bias in favor of males to account for just 1% 
of the variance in performance evaluations resulted in females occupying only 
35% of the highest-level management positions in the simulated organization 
(Martell et al., 1996).  
Robison-Cox et al. (2007) expanded Martell et al.’s (1996) model by 
including differences between males and females in work experience, attrition, 
career delays, external versus internal hires, and risk-taking behavior in 
conjunction with bias in performance evaluations. Robison-Cox et al. (2007) 
defined work experience as an individual holding either a line or staff position in 
an organization. They also included differential attrition rates such that males and 
females left an organization for reasons including a lack of job opportunity at the 
current organization, job opportunities available at different organizations, and/or 
personal, family, or health reasons. Differences in career delays was defined as 
the possibility of a woman taking a year off for maternity leave. The authors also 
modeled risk-taking behavior, which represented increased risk-taking of males 
resulting in greater variance in performance evaluations for males. Robison-Cox 
et al. (2007) found these five additional factors did not produce OGS alone; 
rather, their combinatorial effects led to varying amounts of OGS in 
organizations. 
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Samuelson et al. (2018) also examined how both bottom-up (i.e., 
interpersonal) and top-down (i.e., contextual) processes interact to produce OGS 
with an agent-based simulation to focus on the interactive effects of 
developmental opportunities and external hiring rates of females in comparison to 
males. Both developmental opportunities and external hiring rates contributed to 
OGS by influencing the rate at which females voluntarily left the organization. 
The present study seeks to continue this line of research using computational 
modeling to comprehensively understand the processes impacting OGS and 
provide organizations an explanation of how OGS manifests, and evaluate ways 
organizations may combat negative outcomes from these processes to reduce 
OGS and positively impact organizational workforce potential. 
Research Focus 
This study examined how top-down (i.e., selection, performance appraisal, 
and developmental opportunities) and bottom-up processes (i.e., career and 
familial decisions) interact dynamically to produce OGS and limit women in 
upper level management using a computational model. The OGS model 
incorporated a set of factors as model parameters to examine their interactive 
effects in impacting OGS and workforce potential. Organizational workforce 
potential, defined in this study as the average of true ability of employees in an 
organization (Scullen, Bergey, & Aiman-Smith, 2005), is negatively affected 
when certain groups experience bias in the workplace. If women are rated lower 
on performance compared to men, they will tend to be overlooked when making 
promotional decisions. As a result, an organization may not promote its best 
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talent, and thus, organizational workforce potential can suffer. This study utilized 
two virtual experiments to understand the process of OGS and examine potential 
organizational interventions to reduce OGS. For each virtual experiment, a 
hierarchically-structured organization was initialized containing individuals with 
varying characteristics, including gender, age, retirement age, ability, and 
leadership quality. The first virtual experiment explored the theoretical space in 
which the OGS model parameters (i.e., OGS factors) operate. The second virtual 
experiment examined the effectiveness of HR initiatives designed to combat 
factors leading to OGS.  
Virtual Experiment 1 
The first virtual experiment (VE1) examines the theoretical space in which 
the OGS factors operate independently and simultaneously. VE1 assesses the 
effects of the model parameters by altering the parameter values. The model 
parameters in VE1 include: career decisions, familial effects, selection bias, 
performance appraisal evaluation bias, and differences in opportunities. VE1 
allows for the alteration of the values comprising these factors in the model to 
examine how OGS unfolds over time, as well as the implications this holds for 
organizational workforce potential. Throughout VE1, it is suspected that due to 
the biases held against women in organizations, simulated organizations will not 
always promote or hire the top candidates due to incorrect perceptions of how an 
individual truly performs. Additionally, the simulation calculates OGS each 
simulated year to examine how OGS unfolds over time as a function of these 
contributing factors. While certain factors may subtly contribute to OGS, their 
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combinatorial effects were suspected to cumulatively exacerbate OGS over time. 
Thus, I propose: 
Proposition I: Over time, organizational gender stratification will occur 
most severely in the upper levels of the organization.  
Proposition II: Over time, perceived organizational performance will 
exceed true organizational performance in the presence of organizational gender 
stratification. 
Virtual Experiment 2 
The second virtual experiment (VE2) explores how altering the factors 
that affect OGS influence OGS and workforce potential. Following VE1, VE2 
enacts HR initiatives, organized into bundles based on similarity between HR 
initiatives, to combat each of the OGS factors. The HR bundles represent 
underlying themes for organizations to consider when attempting to reduce OGS. 
The first bundle, “Combating Bias,” addresses the bias that women experience 
during selection and performance appraisal processes. The second bundle, “Equal 
Opportunities”, addresses the differences in developmental opportunities as well 
as the familial effects women experience throughout their careers. The final 
bundle, “Even the Playing Field,” addresses the career decisions made by women. 
Table 3 provides an outline of each bundle. 
Table 3 
Human Resource Initiative Bundles Designed to Reduce Organizational Gender 
Stratification. 
HR Bundle HR Initiative Rationale 
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Bundle 1: 
Combating Bias 
Reduce Selection Bias 
Reduce Performance 
Evaluation Bias 
To address bias in 
selection and performance 
appraisal against women 
Bundle 2: Equal 
Opportunities 
Provide Equal Opportunities 
Remove the “Motherhood” 
Penalty 
To address differences in 
developmental 
opportunities and familial 
effects 
Bundle 3: Even 
the Playing Field 
Even the Playing Field To address the career 
choices of women 
 
 Grouping HR initiatives into bundles allows for an examination of how 
effectively related HR initiatives reduce OGS and improve organizational 
workforce potential. I propose the following research questions to explore the 
effectiveness of the three HR bundles: 
RQI: How and to what extent does reducing biases in (a) selection and (b) 
performance appraisal influence organizational gender stratification and 
organizational workforce potential? 
RQII: How and to what extent does providing (a) equal developmental 
opportunities to males and females and (b) improved medical leave policies to 
employees influence organizational gender stratification and organizational 
workforce potential? 
RQIII: How and to what extent does placing more women in line positions 
compared to staff positions influence organizational gender stratification and 
organizational workforce potential? 
Method 
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 This study examines five factors that produce OGS: (1) career decisions, 
(2) familial decisions, (3) selection bias, (4) performance appraisal evaluation 
bias, and (5) differences in opportunities. These factors are examined with respect 
to OGS and workforce potential. This study consists of two virtual experiments. 
The first virtual experiment examines the theoretical space in which the OGS 
factors operate by varying the model parameters to assess how they differentially 
impact OGS and workforce potential. The second virtual experiment explores the 
impact of HR initiatives designed to combat each of the OGS factors by altering 
the initial model parameters based on the bundle instantiated. This study evaluates 
the effectiveness of HR initiatives to reduce OGS and improve organizational 
workforce potential. 
Simulation Set-Up 
Virtual Experiments 1 and 2 utilize the same simulation set-up. First, the 
simulation sets the organizational life-cycle. Previous models of OGS used the 
number of years it takes to replace the organization with entirely new individuals 
(e.g., Samuelson et al., 2018) and find it takes approximately 36 years to do so, or 
used duration for organizational performance to reach equilibrium (Robison-Cox 
et al., 2007) and find it takes approximately 50 years for performance to plateau. 
Using these simulations as guidance, the simulated organizations in this study ran 
for 40 years for any given simulation run. The organizations were initialized with 
six levels, split into 50% line positions and 50% staff positions (Samuelson et al., 
2018). Levels 1-3 represent the upper levels of the organization while levels 4-6 
represent the lower levels. The number of employees set in the simulation is 
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11,490 to model a moderately large organization (Robison-Cox et al., 2007). 
Individuals in the simulation are assigned individual characteristics, which 
include gender, ability, leadership potential, age, and retirement age. At the start 
of any simulation run, the organization consists of 50% males and 50% females at 
all levels of the organization. Agent task ability and leadership potential are both 
drawn from a normal distribution with M = 100 and SD = 15, with upper and 
lower bounds set to 130 and 70, respectively. Agent age is drawn from a normal 
distribution, with the average age in the upper levels of the organization as M = 
55, and the average age in the lower levels of the organization as M = 35, given 
employees in lower organizational levels tend to be younger in comparison to 
those working in upper-levels (U.S. Department of Labor, 2016). Agent 
retirement age is drawn from a normal distribution with M = 65 and SD = 2, with 
a lower bound set to 55. Agents in the external labor pool are hired based on their 
task ability, using the same sampling procedures for initializing the organization. 
Virtual Experiment 1 
 Independent Variables (Factors). The OGS simulation consists of five 
parameters that model the factors contributing to OGS. These factors include 
differences in career selection, familial effects, bias in selection, bias in 
performance appraisal evaluation, and differences in developmental opportunities. 
These parameters were free to vary during VE1 to allow for an examination of 
how each of the factors interactively impact the outcomes of interest (i.e., OGS 
and organizational workforce potential). Within VE1, three conditions were 
created: no bias, low bias, and high bias. Parameters within these conditions were 
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altered to model the OGS processes that unfold within organizations with low bias 
and high bias operating, and to obtain an idealized organization without any OGS 
occurring. 
Career Decisions. VE1 altered the number of women occupying line and 
staff positions to assess the impact of career decisions on the outcomes of interest. 
Previous models set the proportion of women in line positions to 30%, and the 
proportion of women in staff positions to 70% for OGS simulation (Catalyst, 
2007; Robison-Cox et al., 2007; Samuelson et al., 2018). In VE1, women 
comprised between 10% and 50% of line positions depending on the simulation 
condition and organizational level, with the remaining number of women 
occupying staff positions. See Table 4 for exact career decision parameters. 
Table 4 
Proportion of Females Selected for Line Positions by Simulation Condition and 
Organizational Level. 
 Organizational Level 
Simulation 
condition 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
No Bias .50 .50 .50 .50 .50 .50 
Low Bias .25 .35 .40 .45 .45 .50 
High Bias .10 .15 .20 .25 .30 .50 
 
Familial Effects. Previous computational models of OGS include a 
mechanism in which women have a set probability (e.g., 0.20) of removal from 
the internal labor pool in a given year to model the effects of taking maternity 
leave (i.e., Robison-Cox et al., 2007). Additionally, research shows a number of 
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women voluntarily leave their jobs once conceiving children. The 2012 Family 
Medical Leave Act, based on a 2011 a survey of 1,812 worksites across the U.S., 
found approximately 11% of men and 15% of women take leave in a 12-month 
period (FML Report, 2012). Additionally, previous research has noted women 
voluntarily turning over as a result of taking leave is approximately 40% 
(Sandberg, 2013). In VE1, the rates at which men and women took leave was set 
to 11% and 15% for the low and high bias conditions, and set to 13% for both 
males and females in the no bias condition. VE1 also examined different 
probabilities of turnover as a result of taking leave based on simulation condition, 
ranging between 10% and 40%. See Table 5 for exact familial effect parameters. 
Table 5 
Proportion of Males and Females Taking Leave, and Subsequently Leaving an 
Organization. 
Simulation 
Condition 
Proportion taking leave Probability of turnover resulting 
from taking leave 
 Male Female Male Female 
No Bias .13 .13 .20 .20 
Low Bias .11 .15 .15 .30 
High Bias .11 .15 .10 .40 
 
Selection Bias. Previous models of OGS arbitrarily set the probability of 
external hires and the proportion of males in the external labor pool (Robison-Cox 
et al., 2007). In VE1, the probability of external hires was set to .30, .30, .25, .20, 
.10, and 1 for levels one through six, respectively (adapted from Robison-Cox et 
al., 2007). To account for external hiring bias against women, VE1 altered the 
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external hiring probability of women based on the simulation condition and 
organizational level. See Table 6 for exact selection bias parameters. 
 
Table 6 
Selection Probabilities of Females by Simulation Condition and Organizational 
Level. 
 Organizational Level 
Simulation 
condition 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
No Bias .50 .50 .50 .50 .50 .50 
Low Bias .25 .35 .40 .45 .45 .50 
High Bias .10 .15 .20 .25 .30 .50 
 
Performance Appraisal Evaluation Bias. Performance evaluation scores 
were assigned at the start of each performance cycle (i.e., year) and represent the 
perceived ability of the agents by the organizations in the simulation. First, job 
performance of the agents was calculated which averages how well agents 
perform their traditional job duties and how they develop their performance based 
on developmental opportunities. Performance of normal job duties was sampled 
from an average of two values: an agent’s yearly ability, drawn from a normal 
distribution with M = an agent’s task ability (sampled previously), and an agent’s 
gender-by-position score. The gender-by-position score was designed to model 
preference for (a) males and (b) line experience when making promotion 
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decisions. Each individual throughout the simulation was assigned a gender score 
(i.e., 0-4) and a position score (i.e., 0-4) based on their gender and position in the 
organization. These two scores were combined to create the gender-by-position 
score, which was added to an individual’s average task ability and used to sample 
performance on normal job duties. See Table 7 for exact gender-by-position score 
assignments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Bias Values for Gender and Line/Staff Positions by Simulation Condition. 
Simulation 
Condition 
Gender Position Gender-by-Position Score 
 Male Female Line Staff Male/
line 
Female/
line 
Male
/staff 
Female
/staff 
No Bias 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 
Low Bias 3 1 3 1 6 4 4 2 
High Bias 4 0 4 0 8 4 4 0 
 
Agents selected to take leave in a given year also experienced a point 
reduction in performance evaluation scores to model bias against agents taking 
leave in a given year (Judiesch & Lyness, 1999). The amount of points added to 
or removed from performance appraisal evaluations of men and women was 
selected based on the product of (a) the variance in job performance for the year 
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and (b) the variance in job performance selected specifically based on simulation 
condition and gender. These values will be subtracted from female job 
performance to model the motherhood penalty and will be added to male job 
performance to model bonus males receive once returning to work after having 
children (Hodges & Budig, 2010). See Table 8 for exact variance in performance 
evaluation for males and females taking leave based on leave by gender 
parameters.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Variance in Performance Evaluation Bias for Having Children. 
 
 
Variance in performance evaluations 
Simulation 
Condition 
Males Females 
No Bias 0 0 
Low Bias .03 .07 
High Bias .03 .10 
 
Differences in Opportunities. Males and females experience differences 
in developmental opportunities presented within organizations such that males are 
given more opportunities to contribute meaningfully at work and receive more 
feedback on their performance (Women in the Workplace, 2016). Based on this 
notion, individuals were assigned opportunity seeking propensities and 
opportunity presentation values, both drawn from a normal distribution with M = 
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6 developmental opportunities sought and available in a given year. The value of 
six developmental opportunities was based on previous OGS simulations offering 
agents a 50% chance of being presented with a developmental opportunity each 
month in a given year (Samuelson et al., 2018). Males received either 0, 3, or 5 
bias points added to the mean of their opportunity seeking propensities, and the 
mean of the opportunities presented to them depending on the simulation 
condition to model the increased amount of opportunities/feedback both sought by 
and provided to males. See Table 9 for exact bias points added to male 
opportunity seeking and opportunity presentation by simulation condition. 
 
 
 
Table 9 
Bias Added to Male Opportunity Seeking and Opportunity Presentation by 
Simulation Run. 
 Males 
Simulation 
condition 
Opportunity Seeking Opportunity Presentation 
No Bias 0 0 
Low Bias 3 3 
High Bias 5 5 
 
 To model differences in the value of opportunities presented to males and 
females, developmental opportunities taken by individuals were selected based on 
changing values for gender and simulation condition. See Table 10 for exact 
values used for developmental opportunities by gender and condition. 
Table 10 
Value of Developmental Opportunities Provided to Males and Females. 
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 Value given to developmental opportunities 
Simulation 
condition 
Males Females 
No Bias 1 1 
Low Bias 1 .50 
High Bias 1.2 .30 
Additionally, the simulations kept track of how long an agent remains at a 
given organizational level to model increased likelihood of turnover due to lack of 
developmental opportunities (i.e., being passed over multiple times for 
promotions signals an individual is not suitable for future promotions, thus 
lowering their chances of being considered for future promotions; Martell et al., 
2012; Robison-Cox et al., 2007). If an agent was promoted in a given year, level 
tenure was reset to zero. If an agent was not promoted, level tenure was increased 
by one year. When an agent’s level tenure exceeded 4 years, he or she had an 
increased probability (i.e., 40%) of voluntarily leaving the organization. 
Virtual Experiment 2 
Independent Variables (HR Initiatives). The HR initiatives in Virtual 
Experiment 2 (VE2) altered the model parameters investigated in VE1 with the 
goal of reducing OGS and increasing organizational workforce potential. The first 
bundle of HR initiatives (Combating Bias) targeted the parameters that influence 
bias in selection and performance evaluation. The second bundle of HR initiatives 
(Equal Opportunities) targeted the parameters that influence differences in how 
developmental opportunities are sought and presented by females, as well as the 
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likelihood that agents would not return to work after having children. The final 
bundle of HR initiatives (Even the Playing Field) targeted the parameters that 
assign males and females to line and staff positions.  
Bundle 1: Combating bias. This bundle captured how biased evaluation 
of females impacts career advancement. First, females experience bias in selection 
procedures which harms their chances of being selected into managerial careers. 
Additionally, females experience bias in performance evaluation where 
individuals make decisions about the competence of women in their jobs. 
Performance evaluation ratings consequently have implications for which 
individuals are promoted in an organization. Within the simulation, this bundle 
equalized the proportion of females selected from the external labor pool by 
setting a parameter to hire males and females at equal rates (reducing selection 
bias). This bundle also removed the bias in performance evaluations. As a result, 
females were not evaluated more negatively than men for taking leave, and their 
gender-by-position scores were equalized. Performance evaluation scores became 
their true score as opposed to their perceived ability scores (reducing performance 
appraisal evaluation bias). Bias in promotion rates of males and females was 
reduced as a result of eliminating bias in performance evaluation scores for 
females.   
 Bundle 2: Equal opportunities. This second bundle of HR initiatives was 
designed to remove barriers females experience throughout their careers. This 
bundle consisted of providing equal opportunities for development to males and 
females in addition to providing constructive feedback through performance 
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management to address differences in training and developmental opportunities. 
This mechanism removed the bias favoring males in the presentation of 
developmental opportunities. In addition, this initiative set opportunity seeking 
propensities of males and females to be equal, on average, to model how 
encouraging women to ask for opportunities at similar rates to men helps increase 
developmental opportunities presented to agents. This bundle also modeled 
implementing parental leave policies that entice females to return to work after 
conceiving children to address familial effects females experience. Within the 
model, a small proportion of females selected to conceive children in a given year 
voluntarily left the organization. With this HR initiative, males and females left 
the organization due to taking parental leave at equal rates. 
Bundle 3: Even the playing field. The underlying theme of this bundle is 
to encourage females to pursue managerial careers and to remain in them. This 
bundle laid a foundation for decreasing OGS by bringing more females into 
careers that set them up for leadership paths initially. This bundle modeled the act 
of organizations attracting a more diverse job candidate pool and helping females 
recognize their full potential in managerial careers. Within the model, females 
were equally represented in line positions throughout their lifespan in the 
organization, both in the internal and external labor pools. Tables 11-17 show 
how the parameters were altered for each simulated bundle. 
Table 11 
Proportions of Females in Line Positions by Simulation Run and Organizational 
Level. 
 Organizational Level 
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Simulation 
condition 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Bundle 1 .25 .35 .40 .45 .45 .50 
Bundle 2 .25 .35 .40 .45 .45 .50 
Bundle 3 .50 .50 .50 .50 .50 .50 
 
Table 12 
Proportion of Males and Females Taking Parental Leave, and Subsequently 
Leaving an Organization. 
Simulation 
Condition 
Proportion taking leave Probability of turnover resulting 
from taking leave 
 Male Female Male Female 
Bundle 1 .11 .15 .15 .30 
Bundle 2 .11 .15 .15 .30 
Bundle 3 .11 .15 .15 .15 
 
 
 
Table 13 
Selection Probabilities of Females by Simulation Run and Organizational Level. 
 Organizational Level 
Simulation 
condition 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Bundle 1 .50 .50 .50 .50 .50 .50 
Bundle 2 .25 .35 .40 .45 .45 .50 
Bundle 3 .25 .35 .40 .45 .45 .50 
 
Table 14 
Biases for Gender and Line/Staff Positions. 
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Simulation 
Condition 
Gender Position Gender-by-Position Score 
 Male Female Line Staff Male/
line 
Female/
line 
Male
/staff 
Female/
staff 
Bundle 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 
Bundle 2 3 1 3 1 6 4 4 2 
Bundle 3 3 1 3 1 6 4 4 2 
 
Table 15 
Variance in Performance Evaluation for Taking Parental Leave. 
 Variance in performance evaluations 
Simulation 
condition 
Males Females 
Bundle 1 0 0 
Low Bias .03 .07 
High Bias .03 .07 
 
 
 
 
Table 16 
Bias Added to Male Opportunity Seeking and Opportunity Presentation by 
Simulation Condition. 
 Males 
Simulation 
condition 
Opportunity Seeking Opportunity Presentation 
Bundle 1 3 3 
Bundle 2 0 0 
Bundle 3 3 3 
 
Table 17 
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Difference in Values Given to Developmental Opportunities of Males and 
Females by Simulation Condition and Gender. 
 Value given to developmental opportunities 
Simulation 
condition 
Males Females 
Bundle 1 1 .50 
Bundle 2 1 1 
Bundle 3 1 .50 
 
Dependent Variables 
The outcomes of interest for both VE1 and VE2 were OGS and 
organizational workforce potential. The model served to examine how OGS 
dynamically manifests in organizations and how OGS impacts organizational 
workforce potential. 
 Organizational Gender Stratification. OGS was calculated as the 
average proportion of males and females present in each organizational level in 
each year across 1,000 simulated organizations. 
Organizational Workforce Potential. Organizational workforce potential 
was calculated in two ways. Previous research states that aggregation of employee 
knowledge, skills, and abilities contribute to a firm’s performance due to human 
capital resources accumulation (Ployhart & Moliterno, 2011). True organizational 
performance was calculated as the average of all employees’ true job performance 
by level across 1,000 simulated organizations. Perceived organizational 
performance was calculated based on performance evaluations of the agents by 
level across 1,000 simulated organizations. This modeled how perceptions of 
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individual performance based on biased evaluations influence the view of overall 
organizational workforce potential. These two values are compared to examine 
how well an organization thinks it is doing (perceived organizational 
performance) compared to how well an organization is actually doing (true 
organizational performance). If organizations are promoting individuals based on 
perceived performance rather than true performance, and perceived performance 
favors males irrespective of true performance, then organizations are not 
promoting their best talent, and thus, are underperforming. 
Simulation Algorithm Description 
 Both VE1 and VE2 followed the same simulation algorithm. The 
difference between the virtual experiments is seen in the alteration of the model 
parameters. The following section provides an outline of each step in the 
simulation. Within each step, the parameters discussed varied depending on (a) 
the virtual experiment being conducted and (b) the conditions within the virtual 
experiments. Table 18 provides a general pseudo-code for the present model, and 
Figure 1 provides a visual of the present simulation procedure. Additionally, the 
simulation steps are listed below: 
1. Model parameters were set initially. Model parameters included: 
○ Organizational life-cycle set to 40 years. 
○ The base number of opportunities available in a given year; 
○ Bias values for opportunity seeking, opportunities 
presented, and gender and position values; 
○ Selection probabilities of females; 
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○ Proportion of males and females taking leave in a given 
year; 
○ Variance in performance evaluations for individuals taking 
leave in a given year; 
○ Proportion of individuals taking leave that voluntarily 
turnover; 
○ Probability of voluntary turnover based on organizational 
level tenure. 
○ For VE1, these values are altered to examine their 
individual and combinatorial effects; for VE2, these values 
are equalized for males and females depending on the HR 
initiative being examined to model the implementation of 
various HR initiatives. 
2. An organization is created, consisting of six levels (C-suite, SVP, 
VP, Senior Manager, Manager, and Entry Level) split into 50% 
line and 50% staff positions containing 11,490 employees total. 
3. The organization is filled with individuals occupying line and staff 
positions. Individuals are assigned individual characteristics, 
including gender, ability, leadership potential, age, and retirement 
age. 
4. The simulation begins with an incrementation in the time clock 
(year) to year = year + 1. 
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5. Individuals are assigned a gender score, a position score, and a 
gender-by-position score. 
6. Leadership potential is computed for each individual. 
7. Developmental opportunities presented and taken by individuals is 
selected for the year. The opportunities taken are assigned a value 
depending on gender. 
8. Performance on normal job duties and developmental opportunities 
taken is computed. Performance evaluations are conducted. 
9. Proportion of males and females taking leave in a given year is 
sampled. Leave bias is computed and added/subtracted to 
performance evaluation scores. 
10. Simulation outputs are calculated: count of males and females, true 
job performance and perceived job performance by organizational 
level and gender. 
11. Agent age and level tenure are increased by one year. 
12. The voluntary turnover mechanism is enacted, which consists of 
four reasons for voluntarily leaving the organization: reaching 
retirement age (as sampled previously), organizational level tenure 
exceeding 4 years, probability of leaving after having children, and 
leaving at random (set to 4% of the workforce). 
13. The involuntary turnover mechanism, adapted from Scullen et al., 
(2005), is enacted in which the lowest 10% of agents in terms of 
perceived performance are removed.  
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14. The number of external hires is selected based on the proportion of 
external hires at each level set initially. An external labor pool is 
created based on the number of external hires selected. Individuals 
in the external labor pool fill the organization with pre-sampled 
individual characteristics (the same mechanism used to initially fill 
the organization). 
15. The promotion mechanism, in which individuals in the 
organization will be ranked and ordered by level and performance 
evaluation scores, is enacted. The simulation iterates over each 
organizational level and selects the individuals in the 
organizational level below that of the current iteration with the 
highest performance based on how many remaining vacancies 
there are after external hiring is completed. 
16.  The remaining vacant positions in the lowest level (level 6) of the 
organization are filled with external hires. 
17. The simulation continues to run through steps 4-16 when the time, 
year, is less than the simulation duration initially determined (i.e., 
40 years). When year is greater than the simulation duration, the 
simulation will end. 
Table 18 
Pseudo-code for Computational Model of Organizational Gender Stratification.  
Step Action 
1 Set model parameters 
2 Create organization 
3 Fill organization with agents  
4 Increment time clock: year = year + 1 
5 Assign gender, position, and gender-by-position scores 
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6 Compute leadership potential 
7 Enact developmental opportunity seeking and presentation mechanisms 
8 Calculate true performance and perceived performance of agents 
9 Sample individuals taking leave for the year; update perceived 
performance scores 
10 Calculate organizational gender stratification and performance 
11 Increase agent age and level tenure 
12 Enact voluntary turnover mechanism 
13 Enact involuntary turnover mechanism 
14 Select number of external hires; fill organization vacancies with external 
hires 
15 Enact promotion mechanism 
16 Fill remaining vacant positions in level six with external hires 
17  If year < 40, go to Step 4 
 If year > 40, end simulation 
 
 
Figure 1. Simulation Procedure Diagram. 
 
 It is worth noting that there are assumptions inherent in computational 
modeling. The present model consists of three primary assumptions: 1) model 
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parameters were set based on subjective interpretation of previous research; 2) the 
sequential nature of sampling procedures used in the simulation create within-
person variability; 3) bias values are static in the model. See Table 19 for a 
detailed explanation of the model assumptions. 
 
Table 19 
Computational Model Table of Assumptions. 
1. Agent ability, leadership ability, age, retirement age, and opportunity seeking are 
sampled from normal distributions. 
2. There is a 50/50 split of line and staff positions within an organization at all times.  
3. Normal job duty performance is sampled from a normal distribution using static bias 
points added to an individual agent’s sampling mean. 
4. Bias points added to an agent’s sampling distribution mean for performance are static 
values based on points awarded for gender and position. 
5. Developmental opportunity performance is sampled X times for a given individual, 
with X = an agent’s developmental opportunities taken. 
6. Perceived job performance is operationalized as the average of an agent’s normal job 
duty performance and developmental opportunity performance. 
7. True job performance is operationalized as an agent’s true ability, previously sampled. 
8 A forced ranking distribution system removes agents with perceived performance 
evaluation scores lower than the 10th percentile for a given level. 
9. In any given year, agents are sampled to leave voluntarily based on parental leave, 
retirement, tenure in level, or at random.  
 
 
Results 
This study utilized two virtual experiments to understand the process of 
OGS and examine potential organizational interventions to reduce OGS.  The 
primary outcomes recorded in the virtual experiments were (1) OGS (i.e., the 
proportion of males and females in each organizational level), (2) true 
organizational performance (i.e., true ability of agents), and (3) perceived 
organizational performance (i.e., perceived ability of agents influenced by biases). 
Analyses were conducted in two phases - one for each virtual experiment. A 
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hierarchically-structured organization was initialized for each simulation 
containing individuals with varying characteristics, including gender, age, 
retirement age, ability, and leadership quality, to explore the research propositions 
and questions. The first virtual experiment consisted of three conditions (i.e., no 
bias, low bias, and high bias) to explore the theoretical space of the OGS model 
parameters (i.e., OGS factors), and the second virtual experiment examined the 
effectiveness of three bundles of HR initiatives designed to combat factors 
leading to OGS (i.e., combating bias, equal opportunities, and evening the playing 
field). Each of six simulations had time (T) set to 40 years and ran for 1,000 
iterations for a total of 240,000 simulated organizational years. Results were 
aggregated across all 1,000 organizations for each of the simulated conditions. 
Virtual Experiment 1 
The first phase of analyses assessed Propositions I and II, that over time, 
(1) OGS will occur most severely in the upper levels of the organization, and (2) 
perceived organizational performance will be higher than true organizational 
performance in the presence of OGS. The average proportion of males and 
females in each level of the organization was examined for each of the simulated 
conditions (no bias, low bias, and high bias). Findings revealed that under no bias 
(i.e., in a perfectly gender-balanced organization), OGS does not occur in any 
organizational level, as depicted by equal proportions of males and females over 
time. The proportion of males and females across levels and conditions is 
presented in Table 20, and visualized in Figure 2. In years 1, 5, 10, and 15, the 
proportions of females in level one (C-Suite) of the organization in the no bias 
 
 
56 
condition were .50, .50, .50, and .49, respectively. In the low bias conditions, over 
time, deviations in the proportion of males and females in each level increase such 
that males increasingly occupy more positions in all organizational levels, and this 
effect is especially pronounced in the upper levels (i.e., levels one through three) 
of the organization. In years 1, 5, 10, and 15, the proportions of females in level 
one of the organization in the low bias condition were .50, .34, .19, and .15, 
respectively. A similar pattern was found for the high bias condition such that the 
proportion of males in each level increased over time, especially within the upper 
level of the organization. In years 1, 5, 10, and 15, the proportions of females in 
level one of the organization in the high bias condition were .50, .28, .08, and .05, 
respectively. Across the three conditions (no bias, low bias, high bias), OGS 
occurs strongest under high bias (women occupying 5% of C-suite positions), 
followed by low bias (women occupying 15% of C-suite positions), and no bias 
(women occupying 49% of C-suite positions).  
To assess Proposition I, OGS at each organizational level across 
conditions was compared. Given OGS did not emerge in the condition without 
bias, Proposition I was assessed with respect to the low bias and high bias 
condition results. Within both the low bias and high bias conditions, the 
proportion of females lessens with each increase in organizational level. Under 
low bias for levels one (C-suite) through six (Entry Level), females occupied 
15%, 26%, 34%, 38%, 42% and 48% of positions, respectively. Under high bias, 
females occupied 5%, 11%, 23%, 30%, 39%, and 48% of positions, respectively. 
These results support Proposition I such that over time, OGS occurred most 
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severely in the upper levels of the organization. Biases against females have 
minimal impact at the Entry Level, and their impact increases with each 
organizational level. The biases have the strongest effects in the upper levels of 
the organization. 
 
Figure 2. Gender Stratification Across Time and Organizational Level for No 
Bias, Low Bias, and High Bias Conditions. Visualizations truncated at 15 year 
due to patterns plateauing.  
 
Table 20 
Proportion of Males and Females in Organizational Level 1 and 6 for Years 1, 5, 
10 and 15 for No Bias, Low Bias, and High Bias. 
Organizational 
Level Condition Gender 1 5 10 15 
C-suite 
(Level 1) 
No Bias Female 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 
   [.50, .50] [.17, .83] [.17, .83] [.17, .83] 
C-suite 
(Level 1) 
No Bias Male 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.51 
   [.50, .50] [.17, .83] [.17, .83] [.17, .83] 
C-suite 
(Level 1) 
Low Bias Female 0.50 0.34 0.19 0.15 
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   [.50, .50] [0, .67] [0, .50] [0, .50] 
C-suite 
(Level 1) 
Low Bias Male 0.50 0.66 0.81 0.85 
   [.50, .50] [.33, 1] [.50, 1] [.50, 1] 
C-suite 
(Level 1) 
High Bias Female 0.50 0.28 0.08 0.05 
   [.50, .50] [0, .67] [0, .33] [0, .33] 
 High Bias Male 0.50 0.72 0.92 0.95 
C-suite 
(Level 1) 
  [.50, .50] [.33, 1] [.67, 1] [.67, 1] 
Entry Level 
(Level 6) 
No Bias Female 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
   [.50, .50] [.49, .51] [.49, .51] [.49, .51] 
Entry Level 
(Level 6) 
No Bias Male 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
   [.50, .50] [.49, .51] [.49, .51] [.49, .51] 
 Entry Level 
(Level 6) 
Low Bias Female 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.48 
   [.50, .50] [.47, .49] [.47, .49] [.47, .49] 
Entry Level 
(Level 6) 
Low Bias Male 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.52 
   [.50, .50] [.51, .53] [.51, .53] [.51, .53] 
Entry Level 
(Level 6) 
High Bias Female 0.50 0.47 0.48 0.48 
   [.50, .50] [.46, .48] [.47, .49] [.47, .49] 
Entry Level 
(Level 6) 
High Bias Male 0.50 0.53 0.52 0.52 
   [.50, .50] [.52, .54] [.51, .53] [.51, .53] 
Note: values within cells represent the average proportion of individuals (i.e., males or 
females) occupying levels 1 or 6 in a given year (i.e., year 1, 5, 10, or 15). Bracketed 
values represent confidence intervals for the average proportion of individuals across 
1,000 organizational simulations.  
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To assess Proposition II, the average perceived and true performance of 
males and females in each level of the organization was examined for each of the 
simulated conditions. Results from the present study show that under no bias, the 
perceived performance of males and females is approximately equal at all levels 
across time. To demonstrate this result, the following values represent mean 
perceived performance for females and males in levels one (C-suite) through six 
(Entry Level) for year 15 under no bias, respectively: F = 128.79, M = 128.83; F 
= 128.09, M = 128.13; F = 124.73, M = 124.72; F = 118.45, M = 118.47; F = 
109.92, M = 109.92; F = 99.46, M = 99.45. Under low bias, there are deviations in 
perceived performance for males and females. The following values represent 
mean perceived performance for females and males in levels one through six for 
year 15 under low bias, respectively: F = 127.87 M = 130.63; F = 127.75, M = 
129.57; F = 124.84, M = 125.90; F = 118.68, M = 119.50; F = 110.14, M = 
110.95; F = 99.57, M = 100.72. These values show that not only are males 
perceived to be performing at higher levels than females, but these biased 
perceptions grow stronger with each organizational level. High bias results show a 
similar, yet stronger pattern such that the perceived performance for females and 
males in levels one through six for year 15 under high bias are as follows: F = 
127.21, M = 131.14; F = 127.33, M = 130.19; F = 124.79, M = 126.40; F = 
118.62, M = 119.86; F = 109.95, M = 111.24; F = 99.21, M = 101.06. Again, 
these values show that men are perceived to be performing at a higher level than 
females throughout the organization, and the differences are larger with each 
increasing organizational level (see Table 21 for a summary of perceived 
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performance means in year 15 for males and females, and Figure 3 for a 
visualization of gender differences in perceived performance over time). Overall, 
when either low or high bias is present in an organization, males are perceived to 
be performing at a higher level than females throughout the organization. 
Results from the present study also show that under no bias, the true 
performance of males and females is approximately equal at all levels across time. 
To demonstrate this result, the following values represent mean true performance 
for males and females in levels one (C-suite) through six (Entry Level) for year 
15, respectively: F = 127.78, M = 127.82; F = 127.10, M = 127.10; F = 123.73, M 
= 123.74; F = 117.45, M = 117.47; F = 108.92, M = 108.92; F = 98.46, M = 
98.45. Under low bias, there are slight deviations in true performance for females 
and males in levels one through six for year 15: F = 127.49, M = 127.76; F = 
127.23, M = 126.77; F = 124.31, M = 123.10; F = 118.13, M = 116.70; F = 
109.60, M = 108.14; F = 99.02, M = 97.91. Under low bias, in all levels excluding 
level one (C-suite), the true performance of females exceeds the true performance 
of males, which is in direct opposition of perceived performance results. Under 
high bias, there are similar deviations in true performance for females and males 
in levels one through six for year 15: F = 126.88, M = 127.70; F = 127.49, M = 
126.72; F = 124.88, M = 122.93; F = 118.69, M = 116.39; F = 110.01, M = 
107.77; F = 99.24, M = 97.62. Under high bias, in all levels excluding level one 
(C-suite), the true performance of females exceeds the true performance of males, 
which is also in direct opposition of perceived performance results (see Table 21 
for a summary of true performance means in year 15 for males and females, and 
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Figure 4 for a visualization of gender differences in true performance over time). 
Overall, within the low bias and high bias conditions, females had higher true 
performance compared to males throughout the organization, excluding in the C-
suite. 
Table 21 
Average True Performance and Perceived Performance Across Levels in Year 15 
for Low Bias and High Bias Conditions. 
  Low Bias High Bias 
Org Level Gender 
True 
Performance 
Mean 
Perceived 
Performa
nce Mean 
True 
Performance 
Mean 
Perceived 
Performance 
Mean 
C-suite 
(Level 1) 
Female 127.49 127.87 126.88 127.21 
  [117.17, 
129.95] 
[115.88, 
135] 
[112.99, 
129.94] 
[109.05, 
134.99] 
C-suite 
(Level 1) 
Male 127.76 130.63 127.70 131.14 
  [124.58, 
129.31] 
[126.47, 
133.75] 
[124.71, 
129.30] 
[127.54, 
134] 
SVP 
(Level 2) 
Female 127.23 127.75 127.49 127.33 
  [124.56, 
128.76] 
[124.17, 
130.82] 
[122.65, 
129.40] 
[120.87, 
132.52] 
SVP 
(Level 2) 
Male 126.77 129.57 126.72 130.19 
  [125.28, 
127.73] 
[127.96, 
131.01] 
[125.60, 
127.67] 
[128.82, 
131.66] 
VP 
(Level 3) 
Female 124.31 124.84 124.88 124.79 
  [123.45, 
125.15] 
[123.73, 
126] 
[123.93, 
125.77] 
[123.59, 
127.19] 
VP 
(Level 3) 
Male 123.10 125.90 122.93 126.40 
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  [122.43, 
123.76] 
[125.07, 
126.69] 
[122.23, 
123.60] 
[125.59, 
127.19] 
Senior 
Manager 
(Level 4) 
Female 118.13 118.68 118.69 118.62 
  [117.64, 
118.67] 
[118.05, 
119.34] 
[118.19, 
119.23] 
[117.90, 
119.33] 
Senior 
Manager 
(Level 4) 
Male 116.70 119.50 116.39 119.86 
  [116.26, 
117.12] 
[119, 
120.01] 
[115.97, 
116.81] 
[119.38, 
120.34] 
Manager 
(Level 5) 
Female 109.60 110.14 110.01 109.95 
  [109.32, 
109.87] 
[109.81, 
110.48] 
[109.74, 
110.32] 
[109.58, 
110.34] 
Manager 
(Level 5) 
Male 108.14 110.95 107.77 111.24 
  [108.88, 
108.41] 
[110.67, 
111.22] 
[107.53, 
108.05] 
[110.96, 
115.54] 
Entry Level  
(Level 6) 
Female 99.02 99.57 99.24 99.21 
  [98.76, 
99.30] 
[99.27, 
99.88] 
[98.99, 
99.49] 
[98.91, 
99.49] 
Entry Level 
(Level 6) 
Male 97.91 100.72 97.62 101.06 
  [97.67, 
98.17] 
[100.46, 
100.98] 
[97.37, 
97.88] 
[100.80, 
101.34] 
Note: values within cells represent the average performance of individuals (i.e., males or 
females) occupying levels 1 or 6 in a given year (i.e., year 1, 5, 10, or 15). Bracketed 
values represent confidence intervals for the average performance of individuals across 
1,000 organizational simulations. Org = organizational. 
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Figure 3. Perceived Performance Across Time and Organizational Level for No 
Bias, Low Bias, and High Bias Conditions. 
 
 
Figure 4. True Performance Across Time and Organizational Level for No Bias, 
Low Bias, and High Bias Conditions. 
 
These results provide support for Proposition II such that perceived 
organizational performance was higher than true organizational performance in 
the presence of OGS at all levels across gender. Across all three conditions, 
differences between true and perceived performance are strongest when high bias 
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is present, followed by low bias, and no bias (see Table 22 for exact values). In 
the no bias condition, mean differences for true and perceived performance across 
gender by level (one through six) are as follows: Mdifference = 1.01, Mdifference = 1.01, 
Mdifference = 1.00, Mdifference = 1.00, Mdifference = 1.00, Mdifference = 1.00, and Mdifference = 
1.00, all favoring perceived performance. In the low bias condition, mean 
differences for true and perceived performance across gender by level (one 
through six) are as follows: Mdifference = 1.91, Mdifference = 1.66, Mdifference = 1.67, 
Mdifference = 1.67, Mdifference = 1.68, and Mdifference = 1.68, favoring perceived 
performance. In the high bias condition, mean differences for true and perceived 
performance across gender by level (one through six) are as follows: Mdifference = 
2.82, Mdifference = 1.67, Mdifference = 1.69, Mdifference = 1.70, Mdifference = 1.70, and 
Mdifference = 1.71, favoring perceived performance. The difference between true and 
perceived performance is strongest in level one (the C-suite) of an organization 
across all three conditions. When averaging across gender and organizational 
levels, the overall differences in performance between true and perceived 
organizational performance were Mdifference = 1.00, Mdifference = 1.66, and Mdifference = 
1.72 favoring perceived performance under no bias, low bias, and high bias, 
respectively (shown in Table 23). Overall, these results show that organizational 
workforce potential is maximized under no bias and reduced under low and high 
bias. In other words, when OGS is minimized, the true performance of individuals 
more closely resembles the perceived performance of the same individuals, which 
enhances organizational workforce potential. 
Table 22 
True and Perceived Performance Across Levels by Condition for Year 15. 
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Condition Organizational Level 
True 
Performance 
Mean 
Perceived 
Performance 
Mean 
Difference 
No Bias C-suite 
(Level 1) 
127.80 128.81 1.01 
 SVP 
(Level 2) 
127.10 128.11 1.01 
 VP 
(Level 3) 
123.73 124.73 1.00 
 Senior Manager 
(Level 4) 
117.46 118.46 1.00 
 Manager 
(Level 5) 
108.92 109.92 1.00 
 Entry Level 
(Level 6) 
98.46 99.46 1.00 
Low Bias C-suite 
(Level 1) 
127.65 129.56 1.91 
 SVP 
(Level 2) 
127.00 128.66 1.66 
 VP 
(Level 3) 
123.70 125.37 1.67 
 Senior Manager 
(Level 4) 
117.42 119.09 1.67 
 Manager 
(Level 5) 
108.87 110.54 1.68 
 Entry Level 
(Level 6) 
98.46 100.14 1.68 
High Bias C-suite 
(Level 1) 
127.53 130.35 2.82 
 SVP 
(Level 2) 
127.10 128.77 1.67 
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 VP 
(Level 3) 
123.91 125.59 1.69 
 Senior Manager 
(Level 4) 
117.54 119.24 1.70 
 Manager 
(Level 5) 
108.89 110.60 1.70 
 Entry Level 
(Level 6) 
98.43 100.14 1.71 
 
 
Table 23 
Average True, and Perceived Organizational Performance for No Bias, Low Bias, 
and High Bias in Year 15. 
Condition Overall True 
Organizational 
Performance 
Overall 
Perceived 
Organizational 
Performance 
Overall Difference 
Between True and 
Perceived Organizational 
Performance 
No Bias 117.25 118.25 1.00 
Low Bias 117.18 118.84 1.66 
High Bias 117.19 118.92 1.72 
 
It is worth noting that in the C-suite of the organizations within each 
simulated condition, true performance of females did not exceed true performance 
of males. There are two explanations for this unexpected pattern. Both 
explanations are rooted in the sampling procedures used in the present model. The 
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first explanation relates to external hiring processes: the C-suite of all simulated 
organizations in the present model consists of six employees. When a position in 
the C-suite is vacant, a probability of external hire is sampled. If that sampled 
probability favors external hiring, then a new agent is created with a sampled 
gender and true performance ability. The true performance ability of agents in the 
C-suite was drawn from a normal distribution with M = 100, SD = 15 (see 
Methods for more details). It is probable that during a number of simulation runs, 
a female agent was created with sub-average ability, compared to the average 
ability in the C-suite, and placed into the C-suite. Due to the low number of 
females present in the C-suite (i.e., typically only one out of six), it is possible 
that the sampled external hire of a female with sub-average ability into the C-suite 
occurred within the simulations to bring down the average of female true ability 
within an organization. The second explanation relates to the calculation of 
perceived performance in the organization. Perceived performance is the average 
of an agent’s sampled normal job duty performance and developmental 
opportunity performance, both of which are sampled based on a) an agent’s true 
ability and b) incorporated biases depending on the condition (see Methods for a 
detailed explanation). Perceived performance of agents fluctuates year to year 
due: 1) the variance inherent in sampling procedures; 2) the number of 
developmental opportunities an agent takes; 3) being in a line or staff position; 4) 
gender. It is possible that during this sampling, females receive higher perceived 
performance evaluations than their true performance as a result of these reasons, 
which allows perceived performance to be higher than true performance in one 
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year and lower than true performance in another year, allowing lower-ability 
agents to be promoted into the C-suite.  
Virtual Experiment 2 
The second phase of analysis assessed Research Questions (RQs) I-III: 
how and to what extent is OGS reduced and organizational workforce potential 
increased as a result of (I) reducing biases in selection and performance appraisal, 
(II) providing equal developmental opportunities to males and females and 
providing improved parental leave policies to employees, and (III) placing more 
women in line positions compared to staff positions. The baseline conditions used 
for VE2 were the low bias condition parameters set in VE1 since the results of 
VE1 most closely resembled what is seen in organizations today (i.e., 
approximately 80% males occupying upper level leadership positions; Women in 
the Workplace, 2017).  
The three HR bundles were evaluated in relation to OGS, perceived 
performance, and true performance (i.e., same outcomes measured in VE1). In 
examining the effectiveness of the HR bundles in reducing OGS, results show that 
Bundle 1 (removing bias in selection and performance appraisal) is the most 
effective at reducing OGS compared to Bundles 2 and 3. The proportion of 
females in organizational levels one (C-suite) through six (Entry Level) under 
Bundle 1 in year 15 were 0.46, 0.46, 0.46, 0.47, 0.47, and 0.48, respectively (for 
reference, under no bias in VE1, the proportion of females in the C-suite after 15 
years was 0.49). The proportion of females in organizational levels one through 
six under Bundle 2 (equalizing developmental opportunities and providing 
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improved parental leave) were 0.16, 0.27, 0.36, 0.40, 0.44, and 0.49, respectively. 
For Bundle 3 (equalizing the proportion of males and females in line positions), 
the proportion of females occupying levels one through six were 0.16, 0.26, 0.34, 
0.38, 0.42, and 0.48, respectively, for Bundle 3. Table 24 shows the proportion of 
males and females across organizational level in year 15 for Bundles 1, 2, and 3. 
Overall, Bundle 1 was more effective at reducing OGS than both Bundle 2 and 
Bundle 3 (see Figure 5 for a visualization of the emergence of OGS over time 
across the three bundles). 
Table 24 
Proportion of Males and Females Across Organizational Level in Year 15 for 
Bundles 1, 2, and 3. 
  Bundle 1 Bundle 2 Bundle 3 
Organizational 
Level Gender Proportion 
C-suite 
(Level 1) 
Female 0.46 0.16 0.16 
  [.17, .83] [0, .50] [0, .50] 
C-suite 
(Level 1) 
Male 0.54 0.84 0.84 
  [.17, .83] [.50, 1] [.50, 1] 
SVP 
(Level 2) 
Female 0.46 0.27 0.26 
  [.31, .64] [.14, .42] [.14, .42] 
SVP 
(Level 2) 
Male 0.54 0.73 0.74 
  [.36, .69] [.58, .86] [.58, .86] 
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VP 
(Level 3) 
Female 0.46 0.36 0.34 
  [.40, .53] [.31, .43] [.28, .41] 
VP 
(Level 3) 
Male 0.54 0.64 0.66 
  [.47, .60] [.57, .69] [.59, .72] 
Senior Manager 
(Level 4) 
Female 0.47 0.40 0.38 
  [.43, .50] [.37, .43] [.35, .41] 
Senior Manager 
(Level 4) 
Male 0.53 0.60 0.62 
  [.50, .57] [.57, .63] [.59, .65] 
 
Manager 
(Level 5) 
Female 0.47 0.44 0.42 
  [.46, .49] [.42, .45] [.40, .44] 
Manager 
(Level 5) 
Male 0.53 0.56 0.58 
  [.51, .54] [.55, .58] [.56, .60] 
Entry Level 
(Level 6) 
Female 0.48 0.49 0.48 
  [.47, .49] [.48, .50] [.47, .49] 
Entry Level 
(Level 6) 
Male 0.52 0.51 0.52 
  [.51., .53] [.50, .52] [.51, .53] 
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Note: values within cells represent the average proportion of individuals (i.e., males or 
females) occupying levels 1 or 6 in year 15. Bracketed values represent confidence 
intervals for the average proportion of individuals across 1,000 organizational 
simulations.  
 
 
Figure 5. Gender Stratification Across Time and Organizational Level for Bundles 1, 2 
and 3. 
To evaluate changes in workforce potential across the HR bundles, the 
average perceived and true performance of males and females in each level of the 
organization was examined for each of the simulated conditions. Bundle 1 results 
show minimal differences in perceived performance of males and females at all 
levels. To demonstrate this result, the following values represent mean perceived 
performance for females and males in levels one (C-suite) through six (Entry 
Level) for year 15 in Bundle 1, respectively: F = 128.87, M = 128.87; F = 128.00, 
M = 128.08; F = 124.67, M = 124.72; F = 118.40, M = 118.43; F = 109.89, M = 
109.86; F = 99.47, M = 99.41. Males and females are perceived to be performing 
at approximately the same rates when bias in performance appraisal evaluation 
and hiring practices is removed. Bundle 2 does not eliminate differences in 
perceived performance of males and females. To show this result, the following 
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values represent mean perceived performance for females and males in levels one 
through six for year 15 in Bundle 2, respectively:  F = 127.98, M = 130.59; F = 
127.90, M = 129.59; F = 124.96, M = 125.93; F = 118.86, M = 119.54; F = 
110.28, M = 110.99; F = 99.64, M = 100.76. Males are still perceived to be 
outperforming females at all organizational levels. Bundle 3 also does not 
eliminate differences in perceived performance of males and females. To show 
this result, the following values represent mean perceived performance for males 
and females in levels one through six for year 15 in Bundle 3, respectively: F = 
127.92, M = 130.49; F = 127.76, M = 129.59; F = 124.84, M = 125.89; F = 
118.67,  M = 119.94; F = 110.14, M = 110.94; F = 99.55, M = 100.71. In this 
case, males are also perceived to be outperforming females in all organizational 
levels (see Table 25a, 25b, and 25c for a summary of perceived performance in 
year 15 for males and females across organizational levels for Bundles 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively). Overall, Bundle 1 best reduced the discrepancy between male and 
female perceived performance over time (see Figure 6 for a visualization of 
differences in perceived male and female performance over time by 
organizational level). 
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Figure 6. Perceived Performance Across Time and Organizational Level for 
Bundles 1, 2 and 3. 
The average true performance of males and females in each level of the 
organization was also examined for each of the simulated conditions. Bundle 1 
results again show minimal difference in true performance of males and females 
from levels one through six. To demonstrate this result, the following values 
represent mean true performance for females and males in levels one (C-suite) 
through six (Entry Level) for year 15 in Bundle 1, respectively: F = 127.83 M = 
127.86; F = 127.00, M = 127.11; F = 123.68, M = 123.72; F = 117.40, M = 
117.43; F = 108.89, M = 108.86; F = 98.47, M = 98.41. Males and females truly 
performed at approximately the same rates when bias in performance appraisal 
evaluation and hiring practices is removed. Bundle 2 results show slight 
differences in true performance of males and females. The following values 
represent mean true performance for females and males in levels one through six 
for year 15 in Bundle 2, respectively:  F = 127.64, M = 127.76; F = 127.29, M = 
126.78; F = 124.42, M = 123.11; F = 118.29, M = 116.74; F = 109.73, M = 
108.18; F = 99.09, M = 97.95. Similar to results from VE1, female true 
performance exceeds that of males, excluding at the C-suite level, even though 
males occupy more higher-level positions. Bundle 3 also shows slight differences 
in true performance of males and females. To show this result, the following 
values represent mean true performance for males and females in levels one 
through six for year 15 in Bundle 3, respectively: F = 127.38, M = 127.73; F = 
127.24, M = 126.78; F = 124.28, M = 123.08; F = 118.13,  M = 116.69; F = 
109.59, M = 108.13; F = 99.00, M = 97.90. In this case, females are also 
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outperforming males in all organizational levels, excluding in the C-suite level 
(see Table 23a, 23b, and 23c for a summary of true performance in year 15 for 
males and females across organizational levels for Bundles 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively). Overall, Bundle 1 best reduced the discrepancy between male and 
female true performance over time such that males and females occupying each 
organizational level have similar true ability levels, whereas under Bundles 2 and 
3, women have higher ability levels at each organizational level, excluding the C-
suite, compared to males (see Figure 7 for a visualization of differences in true 
male and female performance over time by organizational level). 
 
Table 25a 
Average True and Perceived Performance of Males and Females Across 
Organizational Levels in Year 15 for Bundle 1. 
Condition Organizational 
Level 
Gender Average True 
Performance 
Average Perceived 
Performance 
Bundle 1 C-suite 
(Level 1) 
Female 127.83 128.87 
   [122.16, 129.70] [122.14, 133.61] 
Bundle 1 C-suite 
(Level 1) 
Male 127.86 128.87 
   [122.34, 129.66] [122.92, 133.02] 
Bundle 1 SVP 
(Level 2) 
Female 127.00 128.00 
   [125.37, 128.23] [125.88, 130.01] 
Bundle 1 SVP 
(Level 2) 
Male 127.11 128.08 
   [125.57, 128.16] [126.36, 129.64] 
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Bundle 1 VP 
(Level 3) 
Female 123.68 124.67 
   [122.88, 124.39] [123.77,. 125.58] 
Bundle 1 VP 
(Level 3) 
Male 123.72 124.72 
   [122.98, 124.42] [123.91, 125.50] 
Bundle 1 Senior 
Manager 
(Level 4) 
Female 117.40 118.40 
   [116.95.117.87] [117.99, 118.94] 
Bundle 1 Senior 
Manager 
(Level 4) 
Male 117.43 118.43 
   [116.97, 117.88] [117.94, 118.93] 
Bundle 1 Manager 
(Level 5) 
Female 108.89 109.89 
   [108.60.109.16] [109.59, 110.20] 
Bundle 1 Manager 
(Level 5) 
Male 108.86 109.86 
   [108.59, 109.12] [109.58, 110.14] 
Bundle 1 Entry Level 
(Level 6) 
Female 98.47 99.47 
   [98.21, 98.72] [99.19, 99.73] 
Bundle 1 Entry Level 
(Level 6) 
Male 98.41 99.41 
   [98.16, 98.65] [99.14, 99.67] 
Note: values within cells represent the average performance of individuals (i.e., males or 
females) occupying levels 1 or 6 in year 15. Bracketed values represent confidence 
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intervals for the average performance of individuals across 1,000 organizational 
simulations.  
 
 
Table 25b 
Average True and Perceived Performance of Males and Females Across 
Organizational Levels in Year 15 for Bundle 2. 
Condition Organizational 
Level 
Gender Average True 
Performance 
Average Perceived 
Performance 
Bundle 2 C-suite 
(Level 1) 
Female 127.64 127.98 
   [119.36, 129.94] [119.20, 134.43] 
Bundle 2 C-suite 
(Level 1) 
Male 127.76 130.59 
   [124.52, 129.36] [126.91, 133.95] 
Bundle 2 SVP 
(Level 2) 
Female 127.29 127.90 
   [124.78, 128.82] [124.64, 130.74] 
Bundle 2 SVP 
(Level 2) 
Male 126.78 129.59 
   [125.50, 127.73] [127.99, 131.09] 
Bundle 2 VP 
(Level 3) 
Female 124.42 124.96 
   [123.66, 125.14] [123.90, 126.03] 
Bundle 2 VP 
(Level 3) 
Male 123.11 125.93 
   [122.49, 123.74] [125.10, 126.72] 
Bundle 2 Senior 
Manager 
(Level 4) 
Female 118.29 118.86 
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   [117.81, 118.79] [118.23, 119.45] 
Bundle 2 Senior 
Manager 
(Level 4) 
Male 116.74 119.54 
   [116.34, 117.15] [119.07, 125.05] 
Bundle 2 Manager 
(Level 5) 
Female 109.73 110.28 
   [109.44, 110.03] [109.93, 110.59] 
Bundle 2 Manager 
(Level 5) 
Male 108.18 110.99 
   [107.92, 108.43] [110.68, 111.27] 
Bundle 2 Entry Level 
(Level 6) 
Female 99.09 99.64 
   [98.81, 99.35] [99.33, 99.94] 
Bundle 2 Entry Level 
(Level 6) 
Male 97.95 100.76 
   [97.70, 98.20] [100.49, 101.03] 
Note: values within cells represent the average performance of individuals (i.e., males or 
females) occupying levels 1 or 6 in year 15. Bracketed values represent confidence 
intervals for the average performance of individuals across 1,000 organizational 
simulations.  
 
Table 25c 
Average True and Perceived Performance of Males and Females Across 
Organizational Levels in Year 15 for Bundle 3. 
Condition 
Organizational 
Level Gender 
Average True 
Performance 
Average Perceived 
Performance 
Bundle 3 C-suite 
(Level 1) 
Female 127.38 127.92 
   [114.83, 129.93] [115.28, 134.88] 
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Bundle 3 C-suite 
(Level 1) 
Male 127.73 130.49 
   [124.34, 129.32] [126.19, 133.68] 
Bundle 3 SVP 
(Level 2) 
Female 127.24 127.76 
   [124.52, 128.84] [124.43, 130.68] 
Bundle 3 SVP 
(Level 2) 
Male 126.78 129.59 
   [125.50, 127.75] [128.09, 131.05] 
Bundle 3 VP 
(Level 3) 
Female 124.28 124.84 
   [123.44, 125.10] [123.71, 126.01] 
Bundle 3 VP 
(Level 3) 
Male 123.08 125.89 
   [122.39, 123.76] [125.15, 126.72] 
Bundle 3 Senior 
Manager 
(Level 4) 
Female 118.13 118.67 
   [117.61, 118.62] [118.04, 119.27] 
Bundle 3 Senior 
Manager 
(Level 4) 
Male 116.69 119.49 
   [116.30, 117.10] [119.02, 119.98] 
Bundle 3 Manager 
(Level 5) 
Female 109.59 110.14 
   [109.30, 109.87] [109.80, 110.46] 
Bundle 3 Manager 
(Level 5) 
Male 108.13 110.94 
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   [107.85, 108.39] [110.64, 111.22] 
Bundle 3 Entry Level 
(Level 6) 
Female 99.00 99.55 
   [98.75, 99.26] [99.27, 99.83] 
Bundle 3 Entry Level 
(Level 6) 
Male 97.90 100.71 
   [97.64, 98.16] [100.45, 100.99] 
Note: values within cells represent the average performance of individuals (i.e., males or 
females) occupying levels 1 or 6 in year 15. Bracketed values represent confidence 
intervals for the average performance of individuals across 1,000 organizational 
simulations.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. True Performance Across Time and Organizational Level for Bundles 
1, 2 and 3. 
Across all three conditions, differences between true and perceived 
performance are best minimized under Bundle 1 (reducing bias in performance 
evaluation and selection), followed by Bundle 3 (placing equal proportions of 
males and females in line positions), and Bundle 2 (providing equal 
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developmental opportunities and improving parental leave policies). Under 
Bundle 1, mean differences for true and perceived performance across gender by 
level (one through six) are as follows: M = 1.02, M = 0.99, M = 1.00, M = 1.00, M 
= 1.00, M = 1.00, and M = 1.00. Under Bundle 3 mean differences for true and 
perceived performance across gender by level (one through six) are as follows: M 
= 1.90, M = 1.67, M = 1.68, M = 1.67, M = 1.68, and M = 1.68. Under Bundle 2, 
mean differences for true and perceived performance across gender by level (one 
through six) are as follows: M = 1.95, 1.70, 1.68, 1.68, 1.68, and 1.68 (see Table 
26 for values). The difference between true and perceived performance remains 
strongest in level one (C-suite) of an organization across all three conditions. 
When averaging across gender and organizational levels, the overall differences 
in performance between true and perceived organizational performance was M = 
1.00, M = 1.69, and M = 1.67 under Bundle 1, Bundle 3, and Bundle 2, 
respectively (shown in Table 27). Overall, these results show that organizational 
workforce potential is maximized under Bundle 1, followed by Bundle 3, and 
Bundle 2. In other words, when bias in performance evaluation and selections is 
removed, the true performance of individuals more closely resembles the 
perceived performance of the same individuals, which enhances organizational 
workforce potential. However, improving developmental opportunities, parental 
leave policies, and female representation in line positions does not maximize 
organizational workforce potential as much as removing biases in performance 
evaluation and selection. 
Table 26 
True and Perceived Performance Across Levels by Condition for Year 15. 
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Condition Organizational 
Level 
True 
Performance 
Mean 
Perceived 
Performance 
Mean 
Difference 
Bundle 1 C-suite 
(Level 1) 
127.85 128.87 1.02 
 SVP 
(Level 2) 
127.05 128.04 0.99 
 VP 
(Level 3) 
123.70 124.70 1.00 
 Senior Manager 
(Level 4) 
117.42 118.42 1.00 
 Manager 
(Level 5) 
108.87 109.87 1.00 
 Entry Level 
(Level 6) 
98.44 99.44 1.00 
Bundle 2 C-suite 
(Level 1) 
127.62 129.57 1.95 
 SVP 
(Level 2) 
126.98 128.68 1.70 
 VP 
(Level 3) 
123.71 125.39 1.68 
 Senior Manager 
(Level 4) 
117.43 119.11 1.68 
 Manager 
(Level 5) 
108.87 110.55 1.68 
 Entry Level 
(Level 6) 
98.46 100.14 1.68 
Bundle 3 C-suite 
(Level 1) 
127.60 129.49 1.90 
 SVP 
(Level 2) 
127.01 128.68 1.67 
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 VP 
(Level 3) 
123.68 125.36 1.68 
 Senior Manager 
(Level 4) 
117.41 119.08 1.67 
 Manager 
(Level 5) 
108.86 110.54 1.68 
 Entry Level 
(Level 6) 
98.45 100.13 1.68 
 
 
Table 27 
Average true, and perceived organizational performance for Bundles 1, 2, and 3 
in year 15. 
Condition Overall True 
Organizational 
Performance 
Overall Perceived 
Organizational 
Performance 
Overall Difference Between 
True and Perceived 
Organizational Performance 
Bundle 1 117.22 118.22 1.00 
Bundle 2 117.17 118.86 1.69 
Bundle 3 117.16 118.83 1.67 
 There are two explanations for why Bundle 1 reduced OGS and the 
discrepancy between true and perceived performance of males and females, while 
Bundles 2 and 3 did not. The first explanation is that bias in performance 
evaluation and selection are the strongest contributors to OGS compared to the 
remaining three factors (i.e., career decisions, familial effects, and differences in 
developmental opportunities). The present model calculated true and perceived 
performance evaluations of agents. True performance of agents was equal to an 
agent’s true ability sampled upon entrance to the organization. Perceived 
 
 
83 
performance was calculated based on two factors: 1) sampled normal job duty 
performance, and 2) sampled developmental opportunity performance. Biases in 
developmental opportunities occur when sampling developmental opportunity 
performance by giving lower values to the performance opportunities of females, 
thus decreasing the number of “opportunities to perform” their developmental 
opportunities. Developmental opportunity performance is then sampled based on 
the number of opportunities agents receive. If agents receive fewer developmental 
opportunities, then they have more variation around their mean performance 
which impacts their overall developmental opportunity performance. Performance 
on normal job duties includes added bias points to the mean of the sampling 
distribution used, which more strongly impacts the samples by increasing the 
mean. Taken together, adding bias points to the sampling mean more strongly 
influences how perceived performance was calculated in the present model 
relative to other mechanisms. 
The second explanation is developmental opportunities in the current 
model contribute to perceived performance via sampling from an agent’s task 
ability the number of times that an agent decides to take developmental 
opportunities. This means that the more developmental opportunities an agent 
receives, the less variability there will be around his or her average developmental 
opportunity performance. However, this does not contribute to overall 
performance evaluation as directly as biases in performance evaluation do 
because this does not add to an agent’s mean true ability. Additionally, reducing 
the number of females turning over as a result of taking parental leave does not 
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directly impact performance evaluations, thus making it a weaker contributor to 
overall organizational workforce potential. The mechanism for parental leave 
involves sampling a set proportion of individuals which impacts the performance 
evaluations of the individuals (i.e., reduces evaluations for females, increases 
evaluations for males). These individuals are then sampled to turnover as a result 
of taking leave. However, only a small number of individuals are impacted by this 
mechanism, which explains why the mechanism did not strongly impact results. 
Finally, placing an equal number of males and females in line positions did not 
reduce OGS. The present model favors those in line positions, and especially 
favors when males are in line positions. The mechanism for placing more females 
in line positions was static such that an equal number of males and females were 
in line positions initially within an organization. However, over time, the bias 
against females accumulated to overpower the effects of placing more females in 
line positions.  
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to examine how five factors related to OGS 
interactively impact the proportion of men and women across organizational 
levels, and how organizational gender diversity, in turn, impacts organizational 
workforce potential. Research shows that women face barriers to career 
advancement at all levels within organizations (Baxter & Wright, 2000; Elliott & 
Smith, 2004; Eagly, 2007). This examination considered the emergence and 
interaction of both top-down (i.e., selection, performance appraisal, and 
developmental opportunities) and bottom-up processes (career and familial 
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effects) impacting OGS and organizational workforce potential. Organizations 
can take steps to reduce OGS by targeting the factors that produce OGS. This 
study utilized computational modeling to (1) examine the emergence of OGS as a 
function of interacting individual and organizational processes and (2) how 
human resources initiatives might mitigate OGS while improving workforce 
potential. 
Results from the first virtual experiment show that under no bias in 
selection, performance appraisal, developmental opportunities, career choices, 
and familial effects, OGS does not emerge, and discrepancies between true 
performance and perceived performance of men and women are minimal. 
Although intuitive, these results serve as a baseline for studying OGS. However, 
even when there are small biases against women, there are large discrepancies in 
the proportion of men and women throughout an organization, and this is 
especially pronounced with each higher organizational level. On average, when 
there is low bias against women, men are perceived to perform better in their jobs. 
Yet, results show that if organizations capture true performance, they would find 
women outperform men across organizational levels, excluding in the C-suite. It 
is important to note that the primary route to top leadership positions is based on 
performance perceptions in the current study, and the discrepancies in true versus 
perceived performance of men and women has direct implications for 
promotability. In other words, women are typically evaluated differently than men 
(Foschi 1992; 1996, 2000; Mengel et al., 2017), which, in turn, impacts the 
proportion of women in each organizational level over time such that men are 
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perceived to be performing better than women, and thus, men are primarily being 
promoted into higher organizational levels. The organization is not promoting its 
top talent which impacts the workforce potential of an organization (i.e., human 
capital resources; Ployhart & Moliterno, 2011). A similar pattern of results 
emerged when large biases against women were present such that men were 
perceived to be performing better than women when, in reality, women were more 
capable than men in each level, excluding the C-suite. The primary difference 
between the effects of low bias and high bias in creating OGS is that under high 
bias, OGS occurs more rapidly than under low bias due to stronger deviations in 
perceived and true performance of men and women. Overall, OGS and the 
discrepancy between true and perceived performance are best minimized when 
bias is not present, thus resulting in higher organizational workforce potential.  
Results from the second virtual experiment show how various HR 
initiatives differentially impact OGS and organizational workforce potential. 
Removing bias in performance evaluation and selection practices minimizes OGS, 
almost reducing it entirely. These results are due to equal performance 
perceptions of men and women. When women are viewed as performing as well 
as men, they are viewed as equally eligible for promotion, and thus, reducing 
OGS. Additionally, the discrepancy between true and perceived organizational 
performance are best minimized when removing bias in performance evaluation 
and selection, thus allowing organizations to promote their top talent, irrespective 
of gender. These results are not surprising considering the direct link between 
perceived performance and promotions within the model used in this study. In 
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other words, if individuals are promoted based on their perceived performance, 
and women face biases when their performance is evaluated, then biases women 
face translate into a disadvantage with respect to perceived promotability. When 
removing biases in developmental opportunities between men and women, and 
improving parental leave policies, OGS was surprisingly not mitigated. Results 
showed that OGS still occurs due to differences in how men and women are 
perceived to be performing. The same result is shown with equalizing the number 
of men and women in line and staff positions such that the career choices made by 
individuals does not reduce OGS. One explanation for these results is that the 
direct link between biases in evaluating performance and making promotion 
decisions is stronger than the more subtle mechanisms stemming from the other 
factors (i.e., developmental opportunities, paternity leave, line position 
experience). In other words, even if organizations are able to even the playing 
field in terms of providing women with managerial experience in line positions, 
provide equal developmental opportunities to men and women, and create 
parental leave policies that welcome women back into the organization, failing to 
remove bias in evaluation as a barrier will continue to reinforce OGS, thus 
impacting organizational workforce potential.  
Overall, this study demonstrates the importance of examining interactive 
factors contributing to OGS. When there is low or high bias present in 
performance evaluations, selection, developmental opportunities, familial effects, 
and career decisions, OGS emerges relatively quickly. Additionally, for 
organizations seeking to reduce OGS and improve organizational workforce 
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potential, the present study finds bias in performance evaluation and selection to 
be the strongest contributors (of the five factors examined) to OGS and decreased 
organizational workforce potential. Thus, without reducing bias in performance 
evaluation and selection, focusing HR initiatives on the other three factors (i.e., 
developmental opportunities, familial effects, and career decisions) will not yield 
much value.  
Implications for Theory and Practice 
The present study has implications for both theory and practice. The 
computational nature of this study provides a theoretical exploration of factors 
relating to OGS and provides practical insights for organizations seeking to 
reduce OGS and improve organizational workforce potential. Below I provide 
three key theoretical implications, and three practical implications of the present 
study. 
Theoretical Implications. There are three key theoretical implications of 
the present study. First, studying OGS requires an understanding of factors that 
impact OGS. Results of the present study reveal that OGS emerges relatively 
quickly when there is low and high bias, and that OGS occurs more severely with 
each increase in organizational level. This sheds light on the bottom-up nature of 
OGS such that it is an accumulation of effects from biases over time (Martell et 
al., 2012), confirming that OGS is a dynamic process that warrants longitudinal 
examination as year to year, small differences in promotions eventually manifest 
into substantial OGS over time.  
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Second, the present study built on past examinations of OGS by 
additionally considering the relationship between OGS and organizational 
workforce potential. Previous computational models of OGS have not considered 
the implications of examining true versus perceived performance evaluations, or 
linked OGS to organizational outcomes (Martell et al., 2012; Samuelson et al., 
2018). Bias against women in the present study results in discrepancies between 
true and perceived performance, which holds implications for who is promoted 
within organizations. If organizations do not have a clear picture of who is best 
suited for advancement, then an organization suffers in their organizational 
workforce potential. The link between OGS and organizational workforce 
potential is crucial to study as it represents how OGS translates to 
organizationally meaningful outcomes. As such, the present study provides a 
theoretical examination of the organizational implications of OGS.  
Third, this study demonstrates how various HR interventions impact OGS 
and workforce potential. Results from the present study suggest reducing biases in 
performance evaluation and selection best reduce OGS and improve workforce 
potential. Previous research finds a standardized interview process (Williamson et 
al., 1997) and multiple interview scales with detailed anchor ratings (Campison et 
al., 1997) enhances reliability of the selection process. Research also finds frame 
of reference training (Hauenstein, 1998), structured free recall, source monitoring, 
and error management training (Anderson et al., 2015) reduces biases in 
performance evaluations. The present study suggests better understanding the 
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application and effectiveness of these HR interventions is warranted to reduce 
OGS and improve workforce potential.  
Practical Implications. This study also has multiple practical 
implications. First, this study provides practitioners with novel information 
regarding the impact of OGS in organizations on organizational workforce 
potential. Key organizational stakeholders are typically concerned with the 
bottom-line in their organizations, and this concern does not change with 
heightened awareness of biases against women within organizations (Women in 
the Workplace, 2017). Previous research finds a return-on-investment for 
increasing gender diversity in organizations such that gender-diverse 
organizations are more likely to bring in top talent, appeal to customers (Hunt et 
al., 2015) and have increased financial returns (Hoobler et al., 2016). The present 
study shows how these results emerge, which is due to a decreased discrepancy 
between how performance of men and women is perceived, thus allowing 
organizations to select and promote top talent. 
Second, this study serves as an intervention tool for practitioners wishing 
to improve their organizational workforce potential by reducing OGS. Ideally, 
organizations would enact HR initiatives that combat all fives factors impacting 
OGS, which the present study demonstrates is most effective in mitigating OGS 
and improving organizational workforce potential. However, in reality, 
organizations have to decide which resources to allocate to HR initiatives. The 
present study recommends focusing efforts on examining and reducing biases in 
performance evaluation and selection practices will yield the most impact on OGS 
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and organizational workforce potential. To do this, organization can train 
employees to reduce bias in performance evaluations by conducting frame of 
reference training, structured free recall, source monitoring, and error 
management training (Anderson et al., 2015; Hauenstein, 1998). Organizations 
can additionally conduct interviews in a standardized manner and use multiple 
interviewers (Campion et al., 1997; Williamson et al., 1997). 
Lastly, this study shows the value of studying both individual and 
organizational processes within organizations. Computational modeling is an 
approach that can be applied to a number of organizational issues (e.g., team 
cognition; Grand et al., 2016; turnover; Scullen et al., 2005), and it offers a cost-
effective method of evaluating the nature of interactive processes and the 
potential impact of organizational interventions. Stakeholders that seek to 
understand how OGS unfolds and impacts workforce potential within their 
organizations can utilize the present model. The present model can be altered to 
match the organizational context under investigation to 1) provide an explanation 
for the current gender composition of an organization, and 2) serve as an 
intervention-evaluation tool to decide which set of interventions would yield the 
highest return-on-investment for reducing OGS and improving organizational 
workforce potential. 
Limitations 
This study has several limitations. First, computational modeling is a 
theoretical research tool that does not involve the collection of data; thus, it is not 
necessarily representative of reality. The external validity of a computational 
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model depends on how closely a model reflects empirical patterns. The present 
study used model parameters informed by the literature to mimic empirical 
patterns to minimize the effects of this limitation. Next steps would include 
gathering data on actual organizational processes. For instance, an empirical study 
can examine how an organization makes promotion decisions and evaluate the 
presence of biased decision-making. 
Second, the present model represents only one particular way that the 
mechanisms underlying OGS operate. For example, for the C-suite level in all 
simulation runs, true performance of men exceeded that of women. This was due 
to the nature of 1) external hires and 2) how perceived performance was sampled. 
In a given simulation run, it was possible that 1) a woman was externally hired 
and had a sampled ability lower than that of the men present at that level, or that 
2) in a given year, a woman’s perceived performance was higher than her true 
performance due to variance in sampling which would result in promotion of a 
woman with lower true ability. This is only one way in which mechanisms for 
how agents are selected or promoted into organizational levels plays out. 
However, there could be alternative mechanisms relevant for explaining OGS. For 
example, external hiring criteria could be set to better select candidates into all 
levels based on more than just sampled ability, or variance in sampling for female 
performance can be reduced to model lower risk taking among females compared 
to males (Robison-Cox et al., 2007).  
Third, to calculate organizational workforce potential, mean performance 
of men and women within each organizational level was aggregated to the 
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organizational level using the mean (i.e., using an additive model of compilation; 
Chan, 1998). This approach typically ignores the variance among the aggregated 
means. This approach was acceptable for the purpose of this study based on how 
organizational workforce potential was initially defined (i.e., as the sum of 
individual performance; Chan, 1998). However, it is possible that workforce 
potential is not a direct aggregate of individual performance, and that other 
methods, such as using maximal performance at a given level, is more 
representative of how a group of individuals is performing altogether to represent 
workforce potential. 
Fourth, the present study only examined how five factors impact OGS 
(i.e., bias in performance evaluation, selection, developmental opportunities, 
familial effects, and career decisions). The five factors included in the model 
encompass other factors as well (i.e., “developmental opportunities” is designed 
to tap into opportunity seeking in terms of negotiations and self-improvement). 
However, other variables can impact promotability of individuals, such as risk 
taking (Robsion-Cox et al., 2007), number of hours worked (Bertrand, Goldin, & 
Katz, 2010), or the influence of workgroup composition (Murphy et al., 2007). 
Modeling risk taking among individuals can explore if increased risk taking by 
men results in increased upward mobility. For example, the standard deviation of 
average male performance can be increased to model this and can show if risk 
taking of men increases their likelihood of being promoted. Research shows 
reduced hours worked my women accounts partially for disparities in pay 
between male and female MBAs (Bertand et al., 2010). The present model does 
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not consider how much work an individual is doing, and this factor likely has 
implications for performance evaluations. Lastly, research shows belonging to a 
numerical minority in a group reduces the likelihood that a minority member will 
participate in the group (Murphy et al., 2007). The present study did not consider 
how work group participation impacts the other model factors (i.e., developmental 
opportunity seeking).  
Fifth, the organizational context for this study was a moderately-large 
sized firm with cross-industry averages used as a guideline. Research shows 
differences in trajectories of men and women by sector (e.g., women are more 
represented in retail/restaurants and healthcare compared to industrial 
manufacturing and institutional investment; Women in the Workplace, 2017), and 
by race (e.g., white women comprise more C-suite positions than both men and 
women of color; Women in the Workplace, 2018). The present study did not 
consider a broader organizational context that could provide additional 
explanation for the emerged results. Consideration of organizational industry can 
inform additional parameters necessary for a more accurate depiction of reality. 
For example, the type of positions necessary for advancement expands beyond 
line and staff positions, especially when considering organizational industry. 
Additionally, considering race/ethnicity has implications for the manifestation of 
OGS, such as differential progressions into upper leadership for women of color 
compared to the progression of white women, men of color, and white men.  
Future Research 
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 The study’s limitations provide numerous avenues for future research. 
Future research may additionally expand on the present model by 1) collecting 
data on purported mechanisms in the model, 2) assessing alternative mechanisms 
than those used in the model, 3) incorporating more model factors, and 4) 
expanding on organizational context. To evaluate the mechanisms of this 
computational model, empirical data can be collected to validate them. Grand et 
al. (2016) took a similar approach in studying team cognition by assessing their 
computational predictions using team samples. For the present study, data can be 
collected on an individual’s true ability (e.g., intelligence testing) and on 
performance perceptions (e.g., performance evaluations), and can be compared to 
understand if men are being over-evaluated in their ability compared to women. 
This information would confirm or disconfirm the mechanism for comparing true 
and perceived organizational performance. 
The present model is an examination of the theoretical space that the 
proposed factors operate in. Additionally, the current model presents one way in 
which various mechanisms operate (e.g., how workforce potential is calculated). 
However, as noted in the limitations, these calculations may not be entirely 
representative of real-world human processes, such as workforce potential 
aggregation. Future research can dig deeper into the aggregation of individual 
performance to organizational workforce potential by expanding beyond using an 
additive model of compilation (Chan, 1998), and consider how variations in 
performance within level impact overall organizational workforce potential. For 
example, perceived performance might be stronger at each level based on the 
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perceptions of how well a few individuals are performing rather than how an 
entire group of employees is performing. 
Increasing the number of factors in the model is one way to more closely 
resemble reality. One use of computational modeling is to explain processes 
underlying individual behaviors (Harrison et al., 2007). Individual behaviors are 
not confined to a set of five factors, as demonstrated in this study. Future research 
can incorporate factors such as gender/ethnicity (Women in the Workplace, 
2018), personality (Barrick & Mount, 1991), and/or motivational orientations 
(Payne et al., 2007), for example, to assess how additional individual 
characteristics differentially impact OGS manifestation. However, this does 
present an additional challenge in isolating the impact of individual effects in an 
interdependent model. 
Lastly, expanding on organizational context to include organizational 
industry and other workgroup demographics is needed to round out the strongest 
factors impacting OGS. Future research can build on the current simulation by 
including organizational industry, such as healthcare versus finance, to assess the 
strongest factors relevant for the respective industries, and to see how the 
emergence of OGS changes based on the organizational context. Future research 
can also assess how workforce demographics, such as gender and racial 
composition of workgroups, impacts individual behaviors (i.e., examining the 
numerical minority phenomenon; Murphy et al., 2007).   
Conclusion 
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This study aimed to understand how five factors (bias in performance 
appraisal, bias in selection, differences in developmental opportunities, career 
decisions, and familial effects) interactively impact OGS and ultimately impact 
organizational workforce potential. Overall, when no bias is present, OGS is 
diminished due to equalization of perceived performance and true performance of 
men and women. Under low bias, OGS emerges relatively quick (i.e., within 10 
years) within each organizational level and becomes stronger with each increasing 
organizational level (i.e., OGS is substantially worse in the upper levels of an 
organization compared to lower levels). Under high bias, the same patterns 
emerge although they appear more rapidly and more severely. In examining 
potential HR initiatives, this study points to the criticality of examining bias in 
performance appraisal and selection practices. This HR bundle alone diminishes 
OGS by way of removing male-favoritism in evaluating performance of 
individuals, which allows organizations to promote their best talent regardless of 
gender. Focusing on only increasing the number of women in line positions, 
providing equal developmental opportunities for men and women, and improving 
parental leave policies are not enough to combat OGS based on the model created 
for this study. In sum, OGS is a complex process that accumulates over time as a 
result of subtle top-down and bottom-up processes. This study offers a 
computational model to illuminate and study the complexities involved in the 
emergence of OGS.  
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Appendix A 
Table A1 
No Bias Workforce Potential by Level 
Condition Org Level Gender True 
Performance 
Perceived 
Performance 
Performance 
Difference 
No Bias 1 Female 127.80 128.81 1.01 
No Bias 1 Male 127.80 128.81 1.01 
No Bias 2 Female 127.10 128.11 1.01 
No Bias 2 Male 127.10 128.11 1.01 
No Bias 3 Female 123.73 124.73 1.00 
No Bias 3 Male 123.73 124.73 1.00 
No Bias 4 Female 117.46 118.46 1.00 
No Bias 4 Male 117.46 118.46 1.00 
No Bias 5 Female 108.92 109.92 1.00 
No Bias 5 Male 108.92 109.92 1.00 
No Bias 6 Female 98.46 99.46 1.00 
No Bias 6 Male 98.46 99.46 1.00 
Table A2 
Low Bias Workforce Potential by Level 
Condition Org Level Gender True 
Performance 
Perceived 
Performance 
Performance 
Difference 
Low Bias 1 Female 127.62 129.25 1.63 
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Low Bias 1 Male 127.62 129.25 1.63 
Low Bias 2 Female 127.00 128.66 1.66 
Low Bias 2 Male 127.00 128.66 1.66 
Low Bias 3 Female 123.70 125.37 1.67 
Low Bias 3 Male 123.70 125.37 1.67 
Low Bias 4 Female 117.42 119.09 1.67 
Low Bias 4 Male 117.42 119.09 1.67 
Low Bias 5 Female 108.87 110.54 1.68 
Low Bias 5 Male 108.87 110.54 1.68 
Low Bias 6 Female 98.46 100.14 1.68 
Low Bias 6 Male 98.46 100.14 1.68 
Table A3 
High Bias Workforce Potential by Level 
Condition Org Level Gender True 
Performance 
Perceived 
Performance 
Performance 
Difference 
High Bias 1 Female 127.29 129.17 1.89 
High Bias 1 Male 127.29 129.17 1.89 
High Bias 2 Female 127.10 128.76 1.66 
High Bias 2 Male 127.10 128.76 1.66 
High Bias 3 Female 123.91 125.59 1.69 
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High Bias 3 Male 123.91 125.59 1.69 
High Bias 4 Female 117.54 119.24 1.70 
High Bias 4 Male 117.54 119.24 1.70 
High Bias 5 Female 108.89 110.60 1.70 
High Bias 5 Male 108.89 110.60 1.70 
High Bias 6 Female 98.43 100.14 1.71 
High Bias 6 Male 98.43 100.14 1.71 
 
Table A4 
Bundle 1 Workforce Potential by Level 
Condition Org Level Gender True 
Performance 
Perceived 
Performance 
Performance 
Difference 
Bundle 1 1 Female 127.85 128.87 1.02 
Bundle 1 1 Male 127.85 128.87 1.02 
Bundle 1 2 Female 127.05 128.04 0.99 
Bundle 1 2 Male 127.05 128.04 0.99 
Bundle 1 3 Female 123.70 124.70 1.00 
Bundle 1 3 Male 123.70 124.70 1.00 
Bundle 1 4 Female 117.42 118.42 1.00 
Bundle 1 4 Male 117.42 118.42 1.00 
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Bundle 1 5 Female 108.87 109.87 1.00 
Bundle 1 5 Male 108.87 109.87 1.00 
Bundle 1 6 Female 98.44 99.44 1.00 
Bundle 1 6 Male 98.44 99.44 1.00 
Table A5 
Bundle 2 Workforce Potential by Level 
Condition Org Level Gender True 
Performance 
Perceived 
Performance 
Performance 
Difference 
Bundle 2 1 Female 127.57 129.26 1.69 
Bundle 2 1 Male 127.57 129.26 1.69 
Bundle 2 2 Female 126.98 128.68 1.70 
Bundle 2 2 Male 126.98 128.68 1.70 
Bundle 2 3 Female 123.71 125.39 1.68 
Bundle 2 3 Male 123.71 125.39 1.68 
Bundle 2 4 Female 117.43 119.11 1.68 
Bundle 2 4 Male 117.43 119.11 1.68 
Bundle 2 5 Female 108.87 110.55 1.68 
Bundle 2 5 Male 108.87 110.55 1.68 
Bundle 2 6 Female 98.46 100.14 1.68 
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Bundle 2 6 Male 98.46 100.14 1.68 
 
Table A6 
Bundle 3 Workforce Potential by Level 
Condition Org Level Gender True 
Performance 
Perceived 
Performance 
Performance 
Difference 
Bundle 3 1 Female 127.56 129.20 1.65 
Bundle 3 1 Male 127.56 129.20 1.65 
Bundle 3 2 Female 127.01 128.68 1.67 
Bundle 3 2 Male 127.01 128.68 1.67 
Bundle 3 3 Female 123.68 125.36 1.68 
Bundle 3 3 Male 123.68 125.36 1.68 
Bundle 3 4 Female 117.41 119.08 1.67   
Bundle 3 4 Male 117.41 119.08 1.67   
Bundle 3 5 Female 108.86 110.54 1.68   
Bundle 3 5 Male 108.86 110.54 1.68   
Bundle 3 6 Female 98.45 100.13 1.68   
Bundle 3 6 Male 98.45 100.13 1.68   
 
